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INTRODUCTION 
This is a concise working analysis to the logic of the law in the 
fields of case law, statutory construction and consti tutional interpretation. 
This study should be of interest to the bench and bar in general, so as to 
aid them in their public relations endeavors. 
Le?al reasoning to the non-lawyer has been and can remain a complete, 
dark mystery. Why courts determine causes as they do and why lawyers 
prepare for trials in a specific way are beyond the comprehension of t hose 
1 persons v~o are unschooled in the law. 
A well-knovm and often referred to axiom of the law states that -
"All are presumed to know the law and i gnorance of it excuses no person". 
This statement of fact is not a truism. 
A demonstration of the development of legal concepts, by a study and 
comparison of adjudicated cases over the years, should clearly prove that 
the social and economic structure of the times has a bearing on j uristic 
thought. Statutes or legislative enactments are j udged on the basis of 
what the legislative body intended by the words it used in the enactment 
of laws. 
The legal concept adduced from legislation must come from the words 
used in draf ting the law and their application to f actual situations. 
Constitutional interpretation, on the other hand, allows a court to dis-
regard prior cases precedent in making its finding . 
The average citizen has not been properly educated in the workings 
of our judicial system. The bench and the bar have had little or no 
interest in public relations and therefore the practice of law is thought 
of as a means of evasion, rather than a means of gaining compliance. 
ii 
iii 
Lawyers need good public relations and that factor can be accomplished 
by educating the public with le galistic problems and the modes of le gal 
reasoni ng. 
This study is chronological in presentation so as to demonstrate 
factors outside the law influencing decisions of courts. The public is 
related to the law in that it is bound by its decisions. That relationship 
can be good, if the profession will develop a system of education aimed 
at good public relations founded upon public understanding. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
JUDICIAL PRECEDE!IJTS AND REfl.S ONI NG 
This is an attempt to describe generally the process of legal reasoning 
in the field of case law and in the interpretation of statutes. It is imp-
ortant that the mechanism of legal reasoning should not be concealed by its 
pretense. The pretense is that the law is a system of known rules applied 
II 
by a judge; such a misnomer has long been under attack (1). In an important 
I 
sense legal rules are never clear, and, if a rule had to be made clear 
I 
before i~ could be imposed, societywould be impossible. The mechanism 
ll accepts the differences of view and ambiguities of words. It provides for 
the participation of the community at large in resolving the ambiguity by 
,providing a forum for the discussion of policy in the gap of ambiguity. On 
seriously controversial questions, it makes it possible to take the first 
step in the direction of what otherwise would be forbidden ends. The mech-
anism is indispensable to peace in a community. 
The basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example. It is 
reasoning from case to case. It is a three step process described by the 
1
doctrine of precedent in which a proposition descriptive of the first case 
is made into a rule of law and then applied to a next similar situation. 
The steps are these: similarity is seen between cases; next, the rule of 
law inherent in the first case is announced; then the rule of law is made 
applicable to the second case. This is a method of reasoning necessary 
for the law, but it has characteristics which under other circumstances 
might be considered i mperfections. 
These characteristics become evident if the legal process is approached 
as though it were a method of applying general rules of law to diverse 
1 
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facts - in short, as though the doctrine of precedent meant that general 
I 
---- -
- -
,I 
rules, once properly determined, remained unchanged, and then were applied, 
albeit imperfectly, in later cases. If this were the doctrine, it would be 
disturbing to find that the rules change from case to case and are remade 
•I with each case. Yet this change in the rules is the indispensable dynamic 
I 
quality of law. It occurs because the scope of a rule of law, and therefore 
I 
1 its meaning, depends upon a determination of what facts will be considered 
I similar to those present when the rule was first announced. The finding of 
similarity or difference is the key step in the legal process. The deter-
mination of similarity or difference is the function of each judge. Where 
case law is considered, and no statute is involved, he is not bound by the 
statement of the rule of law made by the prior judge even in the controlling 
i case. The statement is mere dictum, and this means that the judge in the 
present case may find irrelevant the existence or absence of facts which 
prior judges thought important (2). It is not what the prior judge intended 
'' that is of any importance; rather it is what the present judge, attempting 
to see the law as a fairly consistent whole, thinks should be the determin-
1 ing classification. In arriving at his result he may well ignore what the 
I 
past thought important; he will emphasize facts which prior judges thought 
made no difference. It is not the fact alone that he could not see the law 
·i through the eyes of another, for he could at least try to do so. It is ra-
l ther that the doctrine of dictum forces him to arrive at his own conclusions 
, in order to make a decision. 
Thus, it cannot be said that the legal process is the application of 
!known rules to diverse facts. Yet it is a system of rules; the rules are 
discovered in the process of determining similarity or difference. But if 
attention is directed toward the finding of similarity or differ~n~e, ~~her-=~ 
2 
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peculiarities appear. The problem for the law is: \tVhen will it be just to 
treat different cases as though they were the same? A working legal system 
lmust therefore be willing to pick out key similarities and to reason from 
them to the justice of applying a common classification. The existence of 
some facts in common brings into play the general rule. If this is really 
reasoning, then by common standards, thought of in terms of closed systems, 
'it is imperfect unless some major rule has announced that this common and 
ascertainable similarity is to be decisive. But no such fixed prior rule 
exists. It could be suggested that r easoning is not involved at all; that 
is, that no new insight is arrived at through a comparison of cases. But 
reasoning appears to be involved; the con clusion is arrived at through a 
process and was not immediately apparent. It seems better to say the result 
occurred through imperfect reasoning (3). 
Therefore, it appears that the kind of reasoning involved in the legal 
process is one in which the classification changes as t he classification is 
made. The rules change as the rules are applied. More important, the rules 
arise out of a process which, while comparing fact situations, creates the 
rules and then applies them. But this kind of reasoning is open to the 
,charge that it is classifying things as equal when they are somewhat 
different, justifying the classification by rules made up as the reasoning 
or classification proceeds. I n a sense all reasoning is of this type, but 
there is an additional requirement which compels the legal process to be 
this way. Not only do new situations arise but in addition peoples' wants 
change. The categories used in the lega l process must be left ambiguous 
in order to permit the infusion of new ideas. And this is true even where 
legislation or a constitution is involved. The wor ds used by the legislature 
3 
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I 
or the constitutional convention must come to have new meanings. Agreement 
on any other basis would be impossible. In this manner the laws come to 
express the ideas of the community and even when written in general terms 
in a statLrt.e or consti tu t ion, they are moulded f or the specific case. 
However, attention must be paid to the process. A controversy as to 
whether the law is certain, unchanging and expressed in rules, or uncertain, 
changing and only a technique for deciding specific cases misses the point. 
It is both. Nor is it helpful to dispose of the process as a wonderful 
mystery possibly reflecting a higher law, by which the law can remain the 
same and yet change. The law forum is the most explicit demonstration of 
the mechanism required for a moving classification system. The folklore 
of law may choose to ignore the imperfections in legal reasoning, but the 
law forum itself has taken care of them. 
What does the forum require? It requires the presentation of competing 
examples. The forum protects the parties and the community by making 
certain that the competing analogies are before the court. The rule which 
will be created arises out of a process in which if different things are to 
be treated as similar, at least the differences have been argued. In this 
sense the parties as well as the court participate in the law making. In 
this sense also, lawyers represent more than the litigants. 
Reasoning by example in the l aw is a key to many things. It indicates 
in part the hold which the law process has over the litigants. They have 
participated in the law making. They are bound by something they helped 
to create. Moreover, the examples and analogies urged by the parties bring 
into the law the common ideas of society. The ideas have their day in court 
and they will have their day again. This is what makes the hearing fair, 
4 
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he cannot be completely so. Further, the hearing in a sense compels at 
, least vicarious participation by all the citizens, for the rule which is 
•made, even though ambiguous, will be the law to them. 
Reasoning by example shows the decisive role which the common ideas 
' lof the society and the distinctions made by experts can have in shaping 
the law. The movement of common or expert concepts into the law may be 
1 followed. The concept is suggested in arguing difference or similarity in 
a brief, but it wins no approval from the court. The court this time 
reinterprets the prior case and in doing so adopts the rejected idea. In 
, subsequent cases, the idea is given further definition and is tied to other 
ideas which have been accepted by courts. It is now no longer the idea 
' 
· which was commonly held in the society of its birth. It becomes modified 
i 
' 
in subsequent cases. Ideas first rejected but which gradually have won 
I 
acceptance often push what has become a legal category out of the system 
or convert it into something which may be its opposite. The process is one 
in which the ideas of the community and of the social sciences, whether 
. correct or not, as they are accepted in the community, control legal 
decisions. Erroneous ideas, of course, have played an enormous part in 
shaping the law. An idea adopted by a court is in a superior position to 
! influence conduct and opiniGn in the community; judges, after all, are 
rulers. And the adoption of an idea by a court reflects the power structure 
' in the community. But reasoning by example will operate to change the idea 
I 
: after it has been adopted. 
Reasoning by example brings into focus important similarity and 
' difference in the interpretation of case law, statutes and the constitution 
of a sovereign community. There is a striking similarity. It is only 
5 
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wishful thinking which holds that a statute if clearly written can be 
! completely unambiguous and applied as intended to a specific case situation. 
• Fortunately or otherwise, ambiguity is inevitable in both statute and 
constitution as well as with case law. Hence, reasoning by example operates 
I with all three. 
Under the United States experience, contrary to what has sometimes 
been believed when a written constitution of a nation is involved, the 
' court has greater freedom than it has with the application of a statute or 
case law. In case law, when a judge determines what the controlling 
similarity between the present and prior case is, the litigation is decided. , 
The judge does not feel free to ignore the results of a great number of 
I 
cases which he cannot explain under a remade rule. In legislative inter-
pretation, when the prior interpretation, even though erroneous, is deter-
mined after a comparison 6f facts to cover the case, the matter is adjudi-
cated. But this is not true with a constitution. The constitution sets 
up the conflicting ideals of the community in various ambiguous categories. 
These categories bring along with them satellite concepts covering the areas 
of ambiguity. It is with a set of these satellite concepts that reasoning 
by example must work. However, no satellite concepts, no matter how well 
developed, can prevent the court from shifting its course, not only by 
1 realigning cases which impose certain restrictions, but by going beyond 
realignment back to the overall ambiguous category written into the document. 
The constitution, in other words, permits the court to be incon~istent. 
The freedom is concealed either as a search for the intention of the framers 
· or as a proper understanding of a living instrument, and sometimes as both. · 
But this does not mean that reasoning by example has any less validity in 
7 
the field of constitutional interpretation. 
I~ 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AN EXAMPLE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL CONCEPTS 
It may be said that an analysis of legal reasoning places too much 
'! emphasis on the comparison of cases and too little on the legal concepts 
I 
··which are created. It is true that similarity is seen in terms of a word, 
!land inability to find a ready mrd to express similarity or difference may 
ilprevent change in the law. The words which have been found in the past are 
:much spoken of, have acquired a dignity of their own, and to a considerable 
·measure control the final result. As Judge Cardozo suggested in speaking 
JOf metaphors, the word starts out to be free thought and ends by enslaving 
I 
:it (4). The movement of concepts into and out of the law makes the point. 
If the society has begun to see certain significant similarities or differ-
·ences, the comparison emerges with a word. Vfuen the word is finally accep-
I 
ted, it becomes a legal concept. Its meaning continues to change. But the 
comparison is not only between the instances which have been included under 
i t and the case at hand, but also in the case of hypothetical instances 
I, 
which the word suggests. Thus, the connotation of the word for a time has 
a limiting influence - so much so that the reasoning may appear to be 
simply deductive. 
But it is not simply deductive. In the long run a circular motion 
;can be seen. The first stage is the creation of the le gal concept which 
I 
,is built up as cases are compared. The period is one in vvhich the court 
I 
:rumbles for a phrase. Several phrases may be tried out; the misuse or 
misunderstanding of words itself may have an effect. The concept sounds 
like another, and the jump to the second is made. The second state is the 
.period when the concept is more or less fixed, although reasoning by 
jl 
example continues to classify items inside and out of the concept. The 
third stage is the breakdown of the concept, as reasoning by example has 
moved so far ahead as to make it clear that the suggestive influence of 
of the word is no longer desired. 
The process is likely to make judges, lawyers and the community most 
uncomfortable. It runs contrary to the pretense of the system. It seems 
inevitable therefore, that as matters of kind vanish into matters of degree 
and then entirely new meanings develop, there will be the attempt to escape 
to some overall rule which can be said to have always operated and which 
will make the reasoning look deductive. The rule vdll be useless. It 
1 will have to operate on a level where it has little meaning. Even when 
lip service is paid to it, care will be taken to say that it may be too 
wide or too narrow but that nevertheless it is a good rule. The statement 
of the rule is roughly analogous to the appeal to the meaning of a statute 
or of a constitution, but it has had less of a function to perform. It 
is window dressing. Yet it can be very misleading. Particularly when a 
concept has broken down and reasoning by example is about to build another, 
text writers, well aware of the unreal aspects of the old rules, will 
announce new ones, equally ambiguous and meaningless, forgetting that the 
legal process does not work with the rule but on a much lower level. 
The movement of legal concep.ts in case law has frequently been shown 
by pointing to the breakdown of the so-called "inherently dangerous" 
doctrine (5). It is easy to do this because the opinion in MacPherson v. 
'
1 Buick Motor Co. (6) is the work of a judge acutely conscious of the legal 
process and who is articulate about it. But MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 
was only a part of a cyclical movement in which differences and similarities 
9 
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first rejected are then adopted and later cast aside. The description of 
the movement can serve as an example of case law. Roughly, the problem 
has become: the potential liability of a vendor of an article which 
causes injury to a person who did not buy the article from the seller. In 
recent times the three phases in the movement of the concepts used in 
handling this problem can be traced. 
The first of these begins in 1g16 and carries us to 1851. It begins 
with a loaded gun and ends with an exploding oil lamp. The loaded gun 
brought liability to its owner in the case of Dixon v. Bell (7). He had 
sent his thirteen or fourteen year old servant girl to get the musket; in 
playing with the gun she had fired it into the face of the plaintiff's 
son, who suffered severe injuries. In holding that the plaintiff might 
recover damages, Lord Ellenborough attempted no classification of dangerous 
articles. He was content to describe the gun 11 as by this want of care *** 
left in a state capable of doing mischief" ( 8). Thus the pattern begins 
with an article made mischievous through want of careful handling. 
The pattern becomes complicated in 1837 in the case of Langridge v. 
Levy (9) where a plaintiff complained that the defendant had sold his 
father a defective gun for the use of himself and his sons. The gun had 
blown up in the plaintiff's hand. Recovery was allowed, apparently on the 
theory that the seller had falsely declared that the gun was safe when he 
knew it was defective and had sold the gun, knowing it was to be used by 
the plaintiff. It was therefore both a case of fraud and in some sense, 
one of direct dealing between the seller and the plaintiff. The example 
used by the court was the case of a direct sale to the plaintiff, or where 
the instrument had been "placed in the hands of a third person for the 
10 
purpose of being delivered to and then used by the plaintiff" (10). The 
direct dealing point is also emphasized by the statement of one of the 
judges during the argument to the effect that it would have aided the 
plaintiff's case if he had alleged that his father "was an unconscious 
agent in the transaction" because "the act of an unconscious agent is the 
act of the party who sets him in motion" (11). 
In the argument of Landridge v. Levy, counsel for the defendant had 
pointed to a destination between things "immediately dangerous or mis-
chievous by the acts of the defendant" and "such as may become so by some 
further act to be done to it 11 (12). What was urged might be the pattern 
set by Dixon v. Bell. However, the court rejected the use of any such 
distinction, although it remarked in passing that the gun was not 11 of 
itself dangerous, but -lHH:- requires an act to be done, that is, to be loaded, 
in order to make it so". It rejected not only the distinction but any 
category of dangerous articles, because it 
"should pause before we make a precedent by our decisions 
which would be an authority for an action against the 
vendors, even of such instruments and articles as are 
dangerous in themselves, at the suit of any person 
whomsoever into whose hands they might happen to pass 
and who should be injured thereby" (13). 
Nevertheless, the category of dangerous articles and the distinction 
between things of a dangerous nature and those which become so if improperly 
constructed (which need not be the same as requiring a further act to be 
done to make it dangerous) were again urged on the court five years later 
in Winterbottom v. Wright (14). The court refused to permit a coachman 
to recover against a defendant who had provided a defective coach under 
contract of hire. The plaintiff had been driving the coach from Hartford 
to Holyhead when it broke down due to some latent defect; the plaintiff 
11 
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· was thrown from his seat and lamed for life. He was not allowed recovery 
because to extend liability this far would lead to "absurd and outrageous 
II consequences". The court refused to discuss whether the defective coach 
1was a weapon of a dangerous nature, even though the defendant's counsel 
I seemed to be willing to acknowledge the existence of a special rule of 
liability for that category. And as for the application of Landridge v. 
I 
1! Levy, in that case, there was a "distinct fraud" and the plaintiff "was 
really and substantially the party contracting. 11 The court refused to 
find similarly under the fraud concept in the fact that the defendant had 
I sold a coach as safe when he did not know it to be in good condition, or 
under the direct dealing concept in Langridge v. Levy in that "there was 
I 
1 nothing to show that the defendant was aware even of the existence of the 
particular son who was injured" whereas here, the coach "was necessarily 
to be driven by a coachman" (15). The further argument that the plaintiff 
1 had no opportunity of seeing that the coach was sound and secure was 
I 
II 
I insufficient to bring liability. 
Nevertheless, in 1851, in ··Longmeid v. Holliday (16), the concept of 
I things dangerous in themselves, twice urged before the court and rejected, 
finally was accepted. Longmeid had brought a lamp far the use of himself 
and his wife from Holliday, the defendant vendor, who sold the lamp under 
the name of "Holliday's Patent Lamp" and had it put together by other 
persons from parts which he had procured. Vfuen Eliza Longmeid, the wife 
and plaintiff, tried to light the lamp, it exploded. This caused the 
naptha in it to flow onto her person and burn her. She was not permitted 
recovery from the storekeeper. It had not been shovm that the defendant 
knew the lamp was unfit and warranted it to be sound, nor was the lamp 
:#--------=----
inherently dangerous. In discussing those cases where a third person, 
not a party to a contract might recover damages, the court said: 
"And it may be the same when any one delivers to another 
without notice an instrument in its nature dangerous, or 
under particular curcumstances, as a loaded gun which he 
himself loaded, and that other person to whom it is 
delivered is injured there~, or if he places it in a 
situation easily accessible to a third person, who 
sustains dama ge from it. A very strong case to that 
effect is Dixon v. Bell. But it would be going much 
too far to say that so much care is required in the 
ordinary intercourse of life between one individual and 
another, that, if a machine not in its nature dangerous -
a carriage for instance, - but which might become so 
by a latent defect entirely unknown, although discoverable 
by the exercise of ordinary care, even by the person who 
manufactured it, to another, the former should be 
answerable to the latter for a subsequent damage accruing 
by the use of it 11 • (17). 
Thus the doctrine of the distinction between things in their nature 
dangerous and those which become so by an unknown l a tent def ect is 
announced as a way of explaining the difference between a loaded gun 
(which, under the rule however, is explained as a particular circumstance) 
and a defective lamp. As applied in the case, the doctrine describes the 
classification of the lamp as dangerous only through a latent defect and 
results in no liability. But a court could have found as much direct 
dealing in the purchase of a lamp for the use of the purchaser and his 
wife as in the case of a purchase of a gun for t he use of a purchaser 
and his sons • 
The second phase of the development of the doctrine of dangerous 
articles is the period during which the rule as announced in the Longmeid 
case is applied. The phase begins with mislabeled poison and ends with a 
defective automobile. During this time there is also the inevitable 
attempt to extend the cases and to find an overall rule which can classify 
--==~========================~== -:t-
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the cases as though the pattern were really not a changing one. 
It was the purchase of belladonna, erroneously marked as an extract 
of dandelion, which in Thomas v. Winchester (18) in 1852, produced the 
first application and restatement of the rule as announced in the Longmeid 
case. The poison h.a:d been bought at the store of one Doctor Foord, but 
it had been put within a jar and incorrectly labelled in the shop of the 
defendant, probably through the neglect of his employee. The plaintiff, 
Mrs. Thomas, who used what she thought was extract of dandelion, reacted 
1 by having 
"coolness of the surface and extremities, feebleness of 
circulation, spasms of the muscles, giddiness of the 
head, dilation of the pupils of the eye and derangement 
of the mind". 
She was allowed to recover against Vvinchester. The deferrlant 1 s 
negligence had "put human life in imminent danger". No such danger had 
existed in the Winterbottom case, the court explained. This was more like 
the ca.se of the loaded gun in Dixon v. Bell. The imminent danger category 
• would not include a defective wagon but it did include poison. 
Looking back, one might sqy today that the category of things by 
their nature dangerous or imminently dangerous soon came to include a 
' defective hair wash. At least in George v. Skivington (19) in 1869, a 
chemist who compounded a secret hair wash was liable to the wife of the 
, purchaser for injuries caused by the article. But t .he court went about 
its business without explicit regard for the imminently dangerous category. 
It thought that the imperfect hair wash was like the imperfect gun in the 
Langridge case, on the purported fact that the seller there knew the gun 
was defective and lied. It said, "substitute the word 'negligence' for 
fraud and the analogy between the Langridge v. Levy case and this case is 
1.4 
complete". And as for the case of the defective lamp Vvhere there was no 
liability, that was different because negligence had not been found, In 
constructing a pattern for the cases, it appears that loaded guns, defec-
tive guns, poison and now hair wash were in the imminently dangerous 
category. Defective wagons and lamps were outside. 
The next year it became known that a defective balance wheel for a 
circular saw was not imminently dangerous. The New York court stated: 
"Poison is a dangerous rubject. Gunpowder is the same·. 
A torpedo is a dangerous instrument, as is a spring gun, 
a loaded rifle or the like ~Hh'H:-l:*. Not so, however, an 
iron wheel, a few feet in diameter and a few inches in 
thickness, alt hough one part may be weaker than another. 
If the article is abused by too long use, or by applying 
too much weight or speed, an injury may occur, as it may 
fran an ordinary carriage wheel, or wagon axle, or the 
common chair in which we sit 11 ( 20) • 
vVhile applying the imminently dangerous category to defeat liability, 
the New York court took occasion to give a somewhat new emphasis to 
Thomas v. Winchester. It found t hat 
"the decision in Thompson v. Winchester was based upon the 
idea that the negligent sale of poisons is both at common 
law and by statute an inditable offense". 
Certainly that point could be argued. At any rate, three years later 
the New York court said its opinion in the balance wheel case showed that 
Thomas v. Winchester would not result in liabi lity in a case where a boiler 
blew up (21). But the imminently dangerous category received a new member 
in 1882 when the builder of a ninety-foot scaffold to be used in painting 
the dome of a courthouse was held liable to the estate of an employee-
painter who was killed ~h en the ledger gave away (22) . Yet if a defective 
scaffold was in, the court followed tradition in announcing that a defective 
carriage would be out. 
15 
In England, a defective scaffold was also put in the category. The 
plaintiff in Heaven v. Pender (23) was a ship painter who was injured 
while engaged in his work, due to the breaking of defective ropes which 
held his support. He was allmved to recover against the dock owner who 
had supplied the ropes and support. The majority of the judges decided 
the case on the rather narrow issue that the necessary workmen were in 
effect invited by the dock owner to use the dock and required appliances. 
That could have been the explanation also for the American scaffold case. 
The most noteworthy feature of Heaven v. Pender, however, was the flight 
of one of the judges, Lord Esher, at that time Brett, toward a rule above 
the legal categories which would classify the cases. Brett thought 
recovery should be allowed because: 
"Whenever one person supplies goods or machinery, or 
the like for the purpose of their being used by another 
person under such circumstances that everyone of ordinary 
sense would, if he t hought, recognize at once that unless 
he used ordinary care and skill with regard to the con-
dition of the thing supplied or the mode of supplying 
it, there will be danger of injury to the person or 
property of him for whose use the thing is supplied, and 
who is to use it, a duty arises to use ordinary care and 
skill as to the condition or manner of supplying such thing" (24). 
This statement was concocted by Brett from two types of cases: first, 
the case where the operators of two ships are approaching each other and 
due care is required, and second, where a man is invited into a shop or 
' warehouse and the owner must use reasonable care "to keep his house or 
warehouse that it may not endanger the person or property of the person 
invited". Since these two different situations resulted in tile same 
legal rule, or, stated differently, since two general principles when 
applied resulted in the same legal rule, Brett thought there must be 
"some larger proposition which involves and covers both sets of circum-
'====-========-- = - == 
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stances". This was because 
"the logic of inductive reasoning requires that 
where two propositions lead to exactly similar 
premises there must be a more remote and larger 
premise which embraces both of the major propositions". 
Brett's rule of ordinary care ran into some difficulty in looking 
back at the Langridge case and its insistence on both fraud and direct 
dealings. Brett said of the Langridge case, "It is not, it cannot be 
accurately reported 11 , and in any event, the fact that recovery was 
1 allowed on the basis of fraud "in no way negatives the proposition that 
the action might have been supported on the ground of negligence without 
fraud". 
The majority opinion in Heaven v. Pender, while proceeding on the 
invitee point and while refusing to follow Brett in his flight, agrees 
that liability for negligence follows when the instrument is dangerous 
1 11 as a gun" or when the instrument is in such a condition as to cause 
danger "not necessarily incident to the use of such an instrument", and no 
due warning is given. Approving this statement, the New York court in 
IJ 1908 held that the question of a manufacturer's negligence could be left 
to a jury where the plaintiff lost an eye due to the explosion of a bottle 
of aerated water (25). The next year, a defective coffee-urn or boiler 
which blew up and killed a man was permitted to join the aerated bottle 
I in the danger concept ( 26). The coffee-urn case provided the occasion 
for explaining two of the names given the dangerous category. Given an 
•
1 "inherently dangerous" article, the court explained, a manufacturer 
becomes liable for negligent construction which, when added to its 
inherent characteristics, makes it "imminently dangerous". 
The categories by now were fairly well occupied. The dangerous 
-- === ================='-= 
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concept had in it a loaded gun, possible a defective gun, mislabeled 
poison, defective hair wash, scaffolds, a defective coffee-urn and a 
defective aerated bottle. The not-dangerous category, once referred to as 
only latently dangerous, had in it a defective carriage, a bursting lamp, 
a defective balance wheel for a circular saw and a defective boiler. 
Perhaps it is not too surprising to find a defective soldering iron in 
Blacker v. Lake (27) joining the not-dangerous class. But the English 
court, in the opinions of its two judges, experienced some difficulty. 
For the first judge there appears to have been no difficulty in classifying 
the soldering iron as not dangerous. Yet the Skivington case caused 
trouble because it appeared to suggest that negligence could be substituted 
for fraud and perhaps liability would follow even though the article was 
not dangerous. But in that event, the Skivington case should not be 
followed because it is in conflict with Winterbotton v. Wright. Accord-
ingly, the soldering iron not being dangerous, it was error to leave the 
question of negligence to the jury. The second judge suggested a more 
surprising realignment of the cases which threatened the whole danger 
category. He suggested that no recovery should be permitted even though 
the iron fell into the class of things dangerous in themselves. The duty 
of the vendor in such a case he pointed out, would be a duty to warn, but 
' that duty is discharged if the nature of the article is obvious or known, 
as was true in this case. Indeed, the Skivington and Thomas v. Winchester 
cases were explainable on the very ground that the articles appeared 
harmless and their contents were unknown. One might almost say that 
recovery was permitted in those cases because the danger was only latent. 
The period of the application of the doctrine of dangerous articles 
.=;..;;;;.=- -----==-
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as set forth in the Longmeid case and adopted in Thomas v. Winchester may 
be thought to come to an end in 1915 with its application by a federal 
court - the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This is 
the way the law looked to the court: 
"One who manufacturers articles inherently dangerous, 
e.g. poisons, dynamite, gunpowder, torpedoes, bottles 
of water under gas pressure, is liable in tort to 
third parties which they injure, unless he has exer-
cised reasonable care with reference to the articles 
manufactured -l:"**. On the other hand, one who manu-
facturers articles dangerous only if defectively made, 
or installed, e.g. tables, chairs, mirrors hung on 
walls, automobiles, and so on is not liable to third 
parties for injuries caused by them, except in cases 
of wilful injury or fraud 11 (28). 
Accordingly, the court denied recovery in a suit by the purchaser of 
a car from a dealer against the manufacturer when the front wheel broke 
. and the car was wrecked. 
MacPherson v. Buick (29) begins the third phase of the life of the 
dangerous instrumentality concept. The New York Court of Appeals in 1916 
had before it almost a repetition of the automobile cases passed upon by 
the federal court the previous year. The plaintiff was driving his car, 
transporting a friend to the hospital, when a wheel suddenly collapsed. 
1 The plaintHf was seriously injured. The Buick Motor Company, the defendant, 
1 had sold the car to a retailer who in turn had sold it to the plaintiff. 
The defective wheel had been sold to the Buick Company by the Imperial 
; Wheel Company. 
As was to be expected, counsel for the plaintiff urged that an 
, automobile was "dangerous to a high degree", in his brief. It was, in 
fact, similar to a locomotive. "The machine is a fair rival for the 
Empire Express", he said. 
~--- =#:.=- ===============================-= 
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"This is evidenced further by the fact that a person 
running an automobile must have a license of competency, 
equally with the locomotive engineer and by the legal 
restrictions imposed by law in the use of the automobile". 
It was "almost childish to say that an automobile at rest is not 
dangerous. Neithe r is a locomotive with the fire drawn", nor a battery of 
coffee-urns nor a 42-centimeter gun. The automobile, propelled by explosive 
:gases was "inherently dangerous"· The trial judge had char ged the jury 
that "an automobile is not an · inherently dang erous vehicle 11 but had said 
that they might find it "imminently dangerous if defective" (30). As to 
the difference between the two phrases, counsel said there was no point 
"juggling over definitions. 'Inherently 1 means 1 inseparably'. 'Imminently' 
means 'threateningly' " • He did not comment on the request of the 
defendant that the judge charge the jury that recovery depended on the 
vehicle being "eminently dangerous 11 (31). 
The New York Court of Appeals allowed recovery. Judge Cardozo recog-
1nized that "the foundations of this branch of the law ~HH:- were laid in 
Thomas v. Winchester. He said that some of the illust rations used in 
Thomas v. Winchester might be rejected today (having in mind no doubt 
the example of the defective carriage), but the principle of the case was 
I 
the important thing. "There never has in this state been doubt or disavowal 
of the principle itself". Even while remarking that "precedents drawn from 
the days of travel by stagecoach do not fit the conditions of travel today"; 
he was quick to add the explanation: "The principle that t he danger must 
be imminent does not change, but the tb~ngs subject to the princi ple do 
change". And in addition there were underlying principles. The:yr were 
started, more or less, Cardozo said, by Brett in Heaven v. Pender. 
To be sure, Cardozo was not certain that this statement of underlying 
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principles was an accurate exposition of the law of England. He thought 
"it may need some qualification even in our own state. 
Like most attempts at comprehensive definition, it may 
involve errors of inclusion and exclusion". 
He thought, however, that 
"its tests and standards, at least in their underlying 
principles, with whatever qualifications may be called 
for as th~ are applied to varying conditions , are the 
tests and standards of our law". 
He did not comment on the statement of Brett concerning Thomas v. 
Winchester that it "goes a very long way. I doubt whether it does not 
go too far .• 11 
As to the cases, Cardozo recognized that the early ones "suggest a 
narrow construction of the rule." He had reference to the coffee-urn and 
balance wheel cases. But the way to set them aside had already been 
shown. They could be di stinguished because there the manufacturer had 
either pointed out the defect or had known that his test was not the final 
one. The distinction was based upon a point unsuccessfully advanced by 
the losing attorney in Winterbotton v. Wright. Other cases showed that it 
was not necessary to be destructive in order to be dangerous. 
"A large coffee-urn ~H'rll- may have within itself, if 
negligently made, the potency of danger, yet no one 
thinks of it as an implement whose normal f unction 
is destruction". 
"A scaffold", Cardozo pointed out, "is not inherently a dangerous 
instrument"· He admitted that the scaffold and coffee-urn cases may "have 
extended the rule of Thomas v. Winchester", but 
11If so, this court is ccmrnitted to the extension. The 
defendant argues that things inherently dangerous to 
life are poisons, explosives, deadly weapons, things 
whose normal function is to injure or destroy. But 
whatever the rule in Thomas v. Winchester may once have 
been, it has no longer that restricted meaning." 
-== 
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He showed a certain impatience for what he called "verbal niceties". 
He complained that "subtle distinctions are drawn by the defendant between 
things inherently dangerous and things irruninently dangerous 11 • As to this, 
it was sufficient to say, "If danger was to be expected as reasonably 
certain, there was a duty of vigilance, and this whether you call the 
danger inherent or imminent". The rule was: 11 If the nature of a thing is 
such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril, when 
negligently made, it is then a thing of danger". But, "there must be a 
knowledge of a danger not merely possible but probable". Thus, what was 
only latently dangerous in Thomas v. Winchester now becomes imminently 
dangerous or inherently dangerous, or if verbal niceties are to be dis-
regarded, just plain or probably dangerous. 
Elsewhere in commenting on the case, Cardozo seems to make somewhat 
less of the matter of principles. He writes: 
"What, however, was the posture of affairs before the 
Buick case had been determined? Was there any law on 
the subject? A mass of judgments, more or less relevant, 
had been rendered by the saroo and other courts. A body 
of particulars existed in which a hypothesis might be 
reared. None the less, their implications were equivocal -r.~:"*. 
The things classified as dangerous might have been 
steadily extended with a corresponding extension of the 
application of the remedy. They have widened till they 
include a scaffold or an automobile or even pies and 
cakes when nails and other foreign substances have 
supplied ingredients not mentioned in the receipts of 
cook books". 
Cardozo described the legal process in connection with these cases 
as one in which "logic and utility still struggle for the mastery" (32). 
One can forgive Judge Cardozo for this language. It is traditional to think 
of logic as fighting with something. Sometimes it is thought of as fighting 
with history and experience. 
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In a reversal of itself, not so striking because the membership of 
the court was different, the same federal court, hearing another appeal 
in the same case in which it had been decided that a defective automobile 
was not inherently dangerous, now stated with great wisdom: 
"We cannot believe that the liability of a manufacturer 
of an automobile has any analogy to the liability of a 
manufacturer of 'tables, chairs, pictures or mirrors 
hung on walls'. The analogy is rather that of a 
manufacturer of unwholesome food or of a poisonous 
drug" (33). 
MacPherson v. Buick renamed and enlarged the danger category. It is 
usually thought to have brought the law into line with "soci al considera-
tions" (34). But it did not, however, remove the necessity for deciding 
cases. Later, the New York courts were able to put into the category of 
things of danger or probably dan gerous a defective bottle (35), and 
another coffee-urn (36). For some reason or other, admission was denied 
to a defective automobile where the defect was a door handle which gave 
away, causing one of the doors to open, with the result that the plaintiff 
was thrown through the door and under the vehicle. The def ective handle 
did not make the car a "thing of danger" (37). If one is comparing cases 
and examples, it has to be admitted that a door handle is less closely 
connected with those things which make a car like a locomotive than is the 
wheel on which it runs. 
A new freedom follows from MacPherson v. Buick. Under it, as the 
Massachusetts court has said, the exception in favor of liability for 
negligence where the instrument is probably dangerous has swallowed up the 
purported rule that "a manufacturer or supplier is never liable for 
negligence to a remote vendee" (38). The exception now seems to have the 
same certainty that the rule once had. The exception is now a general 
--=-==--==- -============ -=-=-- ---
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principle of liability which can be stated nicely. 
With the breakdown of the inherently dangerous rule, the cycle from 
Dixon v. Bell is complete. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to believe 
that the breakdown makes possible a general rule such as the rule of 
negligence, which now can be applied. As the comparison of cases pro-
ceeds, new categories will be stressed. Perhaps, for example, there will 
be a category for patented, advertised or monopolized articles. The basis 
for such a category exists. 
= 
CHAPTER THREE 
INDUCTIVE AND DEDUCTIVE REASONING 
Customarily we think of case law reasoning as inductive and the 
application of statutes as deductive. With case law the concepts can be 
created out of particular instances. This is not truly inductive, but the 
direction appears to be from particular to general. It has been pointed 
out that the general finds its meaning in the relationship between the 
particulars. Yet it has the capacity to suggest by the implication of 
hypothetical cases which it carries and even by its ability to suggest 
other categories which sound the same. The phase "imminent danger", for 
example, suggested immediacy, inherence and eminence. To this extent, the 
phrase su~ests the instances to be included under it and something like 
deductive reasoning occurs. The new instances will still have to be weighed 
with the old however and the remaking of the concept word itself is apparent. 
It not only comes to have new meanings but the word itself may change. The 
application of a statute seems to be in great contrast. The words are given. 
They are not to be taken lightly since they express the will of the legis-
lature. The legislature is the law-making body. It looks like deduction 
to apply the word to the specific case. 
The difference is seen immediately when it is realized that the words 
contained in a statute are not dictum. The legislature may have had a 
particular case uppermost in mind, but it often speaks in general terms. 
Not only respect but application is due to the general words the legislature 
used. The rules for statutory construction make the same point. They are 
words which tell one how to operate a given classification system. The 
problem is to place the species inside the genus and the particular case 
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inside the species. The words used by the legislature are treated as 
words of classification which are to be applied. Yet the rules themselves 
show that there may be some ambiguity in the words used. The words are 
to be construed in the light of the meaning given to other words in the 
' same or related statute. The specification of particular instances are 
not to be included. But the specification of particular instances, when 
in addition a word of a general category is used, may be the indication 
that other like instances are also intended; hence the ejusdem generis 
rule. 
Thus, in the application of a statute the intent of the legislature 
seems important. The rules of construction are ways of finding out the 
intent. The actual words used are important but insufficient. The report 
of congressional committees may provide some clue. Prior drafts of the 
statute may show where meanings were intentionally changed. Bills pre-
sented but not passed may have some bearing. Words spoken in debate may 
now be studied. Even the conduct of the litigants may be important in 
that the failure of the government to have acted over a period of time 
1 on what it now suggests as the proper interpretation throws light on 
the common meaning. Legislative intent is always difficult to determine (39). 
Justice Reed has given us some Polonius-sounding advice on the 
matter: 
11There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence than the words 
by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its 
wishes. Often these words are suf ficient in and of themselves 
to determine the purpose of the legislature. In such cases 
we have followed their plain meaning. vVhen that meaning had 
led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has 
looked beyond the words to the purpose of the Act. 
Frequently, however, even where the plain meaning did not 
__ pro~u~e _absurd results but merely an unreasonable ~n: 'plainl_! -~---
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at variance with the policy of l egislation as a whole' 
this Court has followed that purpose rather than the 
literal words. When aid to construction of the meaning 
of words, as used in the statute is available, there 
certainly can be no rule of law which forbids the use, 
however clear the words may appear on superficial 
examination. The interpretation of the meaning of 
statutes, as applied to justiciable controversies, is 
exclusively a judicial function. This duty requires 
one body of public servants, the judges, to construe the 
meaning of what another body, the legislators, has said. 
Obviously there is danger t}1.a t the courts 1 conclusion 
as to legislative purpose will be unconsciously influ-
enced by the judges' own views or by factors not con-
sidered by the enacting body. A lively appreciation of 
the danger is the best assurance of escape from its 
threat but hardly justifies an acceptance of a literal 
interpretation dogma which withholds from the courts 
available information for reaching a correct conclusion. 
Emphasis should be laid too upon the necessity for 
appraisal of the purpose as a whole of Congress in 
analyzing the meaning of clauses of sections of general 
acts. A few words of general connotation appearing in 
the text of statutes should not be given a wide meaning, 
contrary ' to settled policy, 'except as a different 
purpose is plainly shown 1 11 (40). 
The words of advice force one to re-examine whether t here is any 
difference between case law and statutory interpretation. It is not enough 
to show that the words used by the legislature have some meaning. Concepts 
created by cases also have some meaning but the meaning is ambi guous. It 
is not clear how wide or narrow the scope is to be. Can it be said that the 
'words used by the le gislature have any more meaning than that, or is there 
,the same ambiguity? One important difference can be noted immediately. 
Where case law is considered, there is a conscious realignment of cases; 
the problem is not the intention of the prior judge. With a statute, the 
reference is to the kind of thing intended by the le gislature. A statutory 
concept however is supposed to suggest what t he legislature had in mind; 
the items to be included under it should be of the same order. 
This is not t he result of inadequate draftsmanship as is so frequently 
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said. Matters are not decided until they have to be. But the precise 
effect of the bill is not something upon which the members have to reach 
agreement. If the legislature were a court, it would not decide the 
effect of a b.ill until a specific fact situation arose demanding an answer. 
Its first pronouncement would not be expected to fill t he gaps. Since it 
is not a court, this is even more true. It will not be required to make 
the determination in any event but can wait for the court to do so (41). 
There is a related and an additional reason for ambiguity. As to what 
type of situation is the legislature to make a decision? Despite much 
gospel to the contrary, a legislature is not a f act-finding body. There 
is no mechanism, as there is with a court, to require the legislature to 
sift facts and to make a decision about specific situations. There need 
be no agreement about what t he situation is. The members of the legis-
lature will be talking about different things; they cannot force each 
other to accept even a hypothetical set of facts. The r esult is that even 
in a non-controversial atmosphere just exactly what has been decided will 
not be clear. 
Controversy does not help. Agreement is then possible only through 
escape to a higher level of discourse with greater ambiguity. This is 
one element V'lhi ch makes compromise pas si ble. Moreover, from the standpoint 
of the individual member of the legislature there is reason to be deceptive. 
He must escape from pressures at home. Newspapers may have created an 
atmosphere in which some legislation must be passed. Perhaps the only 
chance to get legislation through is to have it mean something not under-
stood by some members of the legislative body. If the court in construing 
the legislation is going to 166k at committee reports and remarks during 
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debates, words ~hich would be voted down if included in the bill will be 
used on the floor or in a report as a kind of illicit and, it is hoped, 
effective legislation. It cannot be forgotten that to speak of legislative 
intent is to talk of group action, where many of the group are ignorant or 
misinformed. The emphasis should not be on this fact, but on the necessity 
that there be ambiguity before there can be any agreement about how unknown 
cases will be handled. 
The court will search for legislative intent and this does make a 
difference. Its search results in an initial filling up of the gap. 
The first opinions may not definitely set the whole interpretation. A more 
decisive view may be edged toward, but finally there is likely to be an 
interpretation by the court which gives greater content to the words used. 
In building this interpretation the reference will be to the kind of 
examples that the words used, as commonly understood, will call to mind. 
Reasoning by example will then proceed from that point. There is a diff-
erence then from case law in that the legislature has compelled the use of 
one word. The word will not change verbally. It could change in meaning 
however and if frequent appeals as to what the legislature really intended 
are permitted, it may shift from time to time. When this is done, a court 
in interpreting legislation has really more discretion that it has with 
case law. For it can escape from prior cases by saying that they have 
ignored the legislative intent in passing the bill under scrutiny. 
There is great danger in this. Legislatures and courts are cooperative 
lawmaking bodies. It is important to know where the responsibility lies. 
If legislation which is disfavored can be interpreted away from time to 
time, then it is not to be expected, particularly if a controversy exists, 
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that the legislature will ever act. It will always be possi ble to say 
that new legislation is not needed because the court in the future will 
make a more appropriate interpretation. If the court is going to be free 
to reinterpret legislation, the result will be to relieve the legislature 
from pressure. Legislation needs judicial consistency. Moreover, the 
courts' own behavior in the face of pressure is likely to be indecisive. 
In all likelihood it will do enough to prevent legislative revi sion and 
not much more. Therefore, it seems better to say that once a decisive 
interpretation of legislative intent has been made and in a sense a 
direction has been fixed wi thin the gap of ambiguity, the court should 
follow that direction. In this sense the judicial interpretation is not 
dictum. The words it uses do more than decide the case. They give broad 
direction to the statute. 
The doctrine which is suggested here is a hard one. In many controver-
sial situations, legislative revision cannot be expected. However, the 
democratic process seems to require that controversial changes should be 
made by the legislative body. This is not only because there is a mechanism 
for holding legislators responsible. It is also because courts are normally 
timid. Since they decide only cases before them, it is difficult for them 
to compel any controversial reform unless they are willing to hold to an 
unpopular doctrine over a sustained period of time. The di fficulties which 
administrative agencies have in the face of sustained pressure serve as a 
warning. 
Where legislative interpretation is concerned therefore, it appears 
that legal reasoning does attempt to fix the meaning of t he word. When this 
is done, subsequent cases must be decided upon the basis that the prior 
---
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meaning remains. It must not be re-worked. Its meaning is made clear as 
examples are seen but the reference is fixed. It is a hard doctrine a g-
ainst which judges often rebel. The Mann Act is a good example. 
On ~une 25, 1910, the Mann Act, which recites that it "shall be 
known and referred to as the 'White Slave Traffic Act', went into effect. 
The Act (42) provides in part: 
"Any person who shall knowingly transport or cause to be 
transported, or aid or assi st in obtaining transportation 
for, or in transporting , in interstate or f oreign commerce 
or in any territory or in the District of Col umbia, any 
woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery , 
or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent and 
purpose to induce, entice or compel such woman or girl 
to become a prosti tute, or to give herself up to debauchery, 
or to engage in any other immoral practice -::-J:-'A- shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony". 
The Act was not passed in haste. The Secretary of Commerce and Labor 
had discussed the problem in his 190S report; so had t he Immigration Co~ 
ission in a preliminary report for the year 1909. There were international 
aspects to the problem and a treaty had been concluded. The President had 
directed the attention of Congress to the need for legislation and the 
proposed bill had been considered in majority and minority congressional 
committee reports. 
The Mann Act was passed during a period when large Ameri can cities 
had illegal but segregated "red-light" areas. It was believed that women 
were procurred for houses of prostitution by "white slavers" who 
"were said to operate from coast to coast, in town and 
country, with tenacles in foreign lands, east and west 
and across the American borders. The most sensational 
of these were said to be the French, Italian and Jewish 
rings who preyed upon innocent girls of their respective 
nationalities at ports of entry into the United States 
or ensnared them at the ports of embarkation in Europe 
and even in their home towns" ( 43) • 
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It was thought that they had previously been virtuous and while 
supposedly many of them had been aliens, it was also believed that they 
represented 11 our" women. Once captured, the woman disappeared from her 
own community, was brutally treated and became, as the House Report said, 
practically a slave in the true sense of the word (44). 
The meeting of this assumed situation, the White Slave Traffic Act, 
made it a crime to transport a woman "for the purpose of prostitution, or 
debauchery or for any other immoral purpose". 
·while Representative Richardson said that the bill was "impractical, 
vague, indistinct and indefinite in every respect", (45) the debate shows 
that Congress had in mind some fundamental issues. On one side were those 
who were in favor of home rule or the powers of the states. Congressman 
Bartlett of Illinois was on this side. He said that he found himself 
compelled to resist the enactment of a measure "like this, behind which 
are gathered -rrll* so many forces of morality, piety and reform" (46). 
However, in his voting he was guided by "the great white light streaming 
out of the Constitution11 (47), and he thought that the 
"States still have the police powers to prevent in their 
borders the offenses against morality so eloquently 
denounced by the advocates of this bill -lH(--lf-. I f any 
man lives in a State which fails in its duty to enact 
such laws, I su~t that under our system of government 
hisfirst duty is at home" (4S). 
On the other side were those who argued that "public health and public 
morals appeal to us 11 • They were the ones who said, 
"The proposed legislation is constitutional, and it is 
related to moral considerations of the most compelling 
face. I f it were not true that our penal legislation 
were related to moral questions and moral considerations, 
then the whole fabric of that legislation would lose its 
power to command the approbation of the country11 (49). 
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They were careful to insist, however, that "the sections proposed 
do not amount to an interference i'.r:ith the police powers of the states'~ (50). 
The Act speaks of "prostitution", "debauchery", and of "other immoral 
practice" or "purpose". So far as prostitution was concerned, the report 
of the House Conunittee had said that "the bill reported does not endeavor 
to regulate, prohibit or punish prostitution or the keeping of places 
where prostitution is indulged in". Congressman Adamson noted that the 
purpose of the bill "is not to stamp out prostitution, nor do its advocates 
so contend". He realized that many good men and woman, and sane good 
legislators, thought the purpose was to stamp out prostitution and immoral-
ity, but this was an error. The House Report clearly said that the bill 
reaches the transportation of women "for the purpose of prostitution". 
Representative Peters joined the three elements of white-slave traffic, 
transportation and prostitution together in his statement that 
11 the bill aims to aid in the suppression of the 
white-slave traffic by making it a felony to purchase 
interstate transportation for any woman going to a 
place for purposes of prostitution" (51). 
So far as debauchery was concerned, perhaps it was a mistake to believe , 
that the bill looked to the protection of female virtue. Congressman 
Adamson said that if it had 
"we would unanimously support it • But no such pretense 
even is made. The only professed and possible purpose 
of this legislation is to purify interstate commerce". 
It was perhaps strange then that "there is no attempt to prohibit a 
vile man from buying a ticket to be used by himself or another vile man 
for transportation into another State for the purpose of immorality" (52). 
Nevertheless, carried to its last analysis, the proposition underlying 
the bill 
----==-
"would endeavor to exclude all vile and impure 
people from the use of interstate ~~cilities for 
commerce -:~**. There \'ltmld be a wi~ field of 
different opinion as to Who ~ras vile and impure and 
what practices constituted immorality". 
Somewhat along the same line, the minority report in the Senate 
urged.,"it would be intolerable that the person from whom they purchased 
a railroad ticket should inquire as to the morality or chastity" of the 
person vmo was to use the ticket (.53). 
The Mann Act was passed after there had been many extensive govern-
mental investigations. Yet there was no common understanding of the 
facts, and whatever understanding seems to have been achieved concerning 
the white-slave trade, in retrospect seems incorrectly based. The wards 
used were broad and ambiguous. There were three key phrases: "prostitution", 
"debauchery" and "for any other immoral purpose". The Act was now ready 
for interpretation. 
In 1913, prostitution and debauchery had been applied by the Supreme 
Court. 
Hoke and Economides (54) had been indicted for inducing a woman 11 to go 
in interstate coiillmrce -JBH~ for the purpose of prostitution". They raised 
the question of the constitutionality of the Act. Reasoning by analogy, 
Justice McKenna said 
11 *** surely if the facility of interstate transportation 
can be taken away from the demoralization of lotteries, 
the debasenent of obscene literature, the contagion of 
diseased cattle or persons, the impurity of food and drugs, 
the like facility can be taken away from the systematic 
enticement to and the enslavement in prostitution and 
debauchery of women, and, more insistently, of girls". 
The construction, of course, emphasized the involuntary nature of the 
woman's conduct, the system involved, presumably organized traffic, and the 
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belief that many e>f the women were minors. 
On the same day as the opinion in Hoke and Economides, Justice 
McKenna in Athanasaw v. United States (55) upheld the application of the 
Act through the word "debauchery-11 to a defendant who had caused a girl to 
be transported from Georgia to Florida for the ostensible purpose of 
appearing as a chorus girl in a theatre operated by the defendant. There 
was evi dence of improper advances made to the girl upon her arrival; the 
advances were related to her membership in the theatre group . The Supreme 
Court held that debauchery as used in the Act did not mean only sexual 
intercourse but "was designed to reach acts which might ult i mately lead 
to that phase of debauchery which consisted in 1 sexual actions 1 ". But 
the Circuit Court of Appeals said that this case and Hoke and Economides 
taken together, 11 were so strong as to amount to a direct decision on the 
point" that the White Slave Traffic Act was not confined to cases of white 
slavery (56). 
Then in 1915 the Supreme Court apparently held t ha t the Act was not 
confined to cases where the woman was "practically a slave" (57). The Court 
had before it an indictment of a woman for conspiracy. The conspiracy 
charged was between the woman and one Laudenschlager that he should "cause 
the defendant (the woman) to be transported from Illi nois to Wisconsin for 
the purpose of prostitution". It was argued that since the woman could not 
commit the substantive crime of violating the Mann Act, because she would 
be the victim transported, she could not be guilty of conspiracy to commit 
that crime. Justice Holmes held that she could be, however. He did not 
agree that the woman victim would never be under the prohibition of the 
Mann Act. He said, 
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"Suppose, for instance, that a professional prostitute, 
as well able to look out for herself as was the man, 
should suggest and carry out the journey within the 
act of 1910 in the hope of blackmailing the man, and 
should buy the railroad tickets, or should pay the 
fare from Jersey City to New York, she would be within 
the letter of the act of 1910 and we see no reason why 
the act should not be held to apply". 
Therefore, 
"we see equally little reason for not treating the 
preliminary agreement as a conspiracy that the law 
can reach, if we abandon the illusion that the woman 
always is the victim. The words of the statute punish 
the transportation of a woman for the purpose of pros-
titution even if she were the first to suggest the crime". 
The court took the view that the woman could be punished over the 
objections of Justices Lamar and Day, who dissented in part on constitutional 
grounds: "Congress had no power to punish immorality". If then the 
"woman could be so punished for conspiring with her 
slaver, the fundamental idea that makes the act valid 
would be destroyed. She would cease to be an object 
of traffic ~** so as to be subject to regulative 
prohibitions under the Commerce Clause - but would be 
voluntarily traveling on her om account ~:-**". 
It became clear in the Caminetti (5g) cases in 1917, when the Supreme 
Court applied the phrase "for any other immoral purpose", that organized 
traffic did not have to be involved. The indictments considered in 
Caminetti involved the transportation of women for the purpose of paid 
cohabitation for the purpose of having them become mistresses and concubines. 
However, the indictments did not involve commercialized and organized vice. 
Counsel for the defendants urged this conclusion. They referred to 
the House Committee Report to "demonstrate that commercial traffic alone was 
in view" (59). They pointed to what they termed "an unofficial communication 
to one of his subordinates" by the Attorney General, in which they claimed 
that the Attorney General said that the legislation 11does not attempt to 
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regulate the practice of voluntary prostitution but aims solely to prevent 
panderers and procurers" from persuing their infamous trade. This was 
11 the full equivalent of saying that the law does not 
apply to those who indulge their own passions merely 
for their own gratification, but applies solely to 
those who engage in the trade of pandering to the 
passions of others" ( 60). 
Not only was the vice not organized and commercialized, but the women 
were not inexperienced victims. In one case, while there was conflicting 
·testimony before the jury, there was some evidence that t he woman was doing 
the pursuing. Another case was described by counsel as follows: 
" -IHH!- the woman was a public prostitute and made no 
pretense at virtue. Hays happened to meet her at 
Oklahoma City while attending a cattlemans' convention 
there, and after his return to his home, another woman 
telegraphed the Oklahoma woman to come to Kansas, sending 
her the money with which to buy the ticket. In response 
to that message, the woman went from Oklahoma City to 
Wichita, where she met and entertained Hays. We may 
justly censure the man for associating with those loose 
women, but that was the extent of his offense, for 
there is not, so far as the woman in this case is con-
cerned, a single aggravating circumstance; and yet this 
man of good standing in the community where he lives 
with a wife and children dependent on him, has been 
sentenced to the penitentiary for eighteen months, stripped 
of his civil rights, his wife deprived of his support, 
his boy and girl forever branded as the child of a 
convict, and all for no better reason than that he 
made a mistake which the State of Kansas might have 
adequately punished by a fine. To subject American 
citizens to such punishments for such offenses will 
brutalize the American people in time, and to suppose 
that the American Congress intended such a result 
impeaches its wisdom as well as its sense of justice" (61). 
The result would be: 
II{H~* that for every man who can be convicted under this 
statute, two men will submit to extortion and pay blood-
money to save themselves, their families and their friends 
from the humiliation which an exposure to their mistakes 
would bring" ( 62). 
The prosecution placed its case on the plain meaning of the phrase 
==========~=========================----- ---
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"prostitution or debauchery, or other immoral purpose". I t agreed that 
"other immoral purpose '' included "words of such generality tha t a criminal 
conviction thereunder could not be tolerated for acts whose purpose was 
any and every sort of immorality". The words "must be limited to that 
genus of which the preceding descriptions are species". The problem was 
to find the genus. The defendant's contention that the genus was "comm-
ercialized vice" was wrong because, while prostitution involved the finan-
cial element, debauchery did not, since it only involved "a leading of a 
chaste girl into unchastity ~H:"* . The nexus indicative of the genus is 
sexual immorali ty 11 ( 63) • 
The Court said it was giving effect to the "common understanding 11 and 
"plain import" of the words which could not be ch anged by reference t o the 
House Committee report or to the title. Moreover, the fact that the 
"Act as it is written opens the door to blackmailing 
op erations upon a large scale, is no reason why the 
courts should refuse to enforce it according to its 
terms" ( 64). 
At the very least, Caminetti set the direction of the Mann Act to 
include more than white slavery; at most it imported into the statute all 
acts commonly thought to be sexually immoral. The suggested definition of 
11 any other immoral purpose" , went far beyond the facts to include t hose 
things which "common understanding" or views almost universally held in 
this country would regard as immoral in the matter of sexual intercourse. 
Jus tice Stone in 1932, while holding that mere acquiescence by a woman 
would not subject her to a conspiracy conviction, sai d flatly, 
"Congress set out in the Mann Act to deal with cases 
which frequently, if not normally, involve consent and 
agreement on the part of the woman to the forbidden 
transportation" (65). 
- ---- ==== ==============="'-==.c..====- -
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Yet the actual facts of the Caminetti cases did involve paid prosti-
tution or concubinage, ans also, it would be easy to argue, some form of 
coercion, although not the coercion of white slavery. A good deal of 
ambiguity remained. 
Surely, no member of the Mann Act Congress had thought about such facts 
as were involved in the Mortensen case ( 66). It was true that the peti-
tioners operated a house of prostitution in Grand Island, Nebraska. They 
were husband and wife. 
"In 1940 they planned an a~tomobile trip to Salt Lake 
City, Utah, in order to visit Mrs. Mortensen 1 s parents. 
Two girls who were employed by the petitioners as pros-
titutes asked to be taken along for a vacation and the 
Mortensens agreed to their request. They ¢otored to 
Yellowstone National Park and then on to Salt Lake City, 
where they all stayed at a tourist camp for four or five 
days. They visited Hrs. Hortensen's parents and in addition 
the girls went to shows. The group then returned in the 
petitioner's automobile to Grand Island; on arrival, they 
drove immediately to the petitioner's house of ill fame and 
retired to their respective rooms". 
It was easy to argue that at the halfway point of the trip, namely, 
when the journey back from Salt Lake City began, the girls were being 
transported to Grand Island for an immoral purpose. It was also easy to 
urge on the other side that "the sole purpose of the journey from beginning 
to end was to provide innocent recreation", and in any event, the inter-
state commerce journey was hardly 11 a calculated means for effectuating 
sexual immorality" since, from all that appeared, leaving the girls in 
Grand Island would have worked just as well. The Supreme Court had diffi-
culty with the case but in a five-to-four decision refused to uphold the 
conviction. 
The majority opinion went on the ground that the purpose of the trip 
was innocent. 
-=- --= ---~ -===-=======-'==' 
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"In ordinary speech an interstate trip undert aken for an innocent 
vacation purpose constitutes the use of interstate commerce for that 
innocent purpose". Thinking of the vacation category one need not think 
of the immoral purpose concept. There was nothing, Justice Murphy said, 
1 to show that "petitioners forced the girls against their wills to return 
1 to Gr and Island for immoral purposes". He said: 
"We do not here question or reconsider any previous 
construction placed on the Act which m~ have led the 
federal government into areas of regulation not originally 
contemplated by Congress. But experience with the 
administration of the law admonishes us against adding 
another chapter of statuto~ construction and application 
which would have a similar effect and which would make 
possi ble even further justification of the fear expressed 
at the time of the adoption of the legislation that its 
broad provisions are liable to furnish boundless 
opportunity to hold up and blackmail and make unnecessary 
trouble without any corresponding benefits to society." 
"To punish those who transport inmates of a house of 
prostitution on an innocent vacation trip in no way 
related to the practice of their commercial vice is 
consistent neither with the purpose nor with the language 
of the Act. Congress was attempting primarily to 
eliminate the 'white slave' business which uses 
interstate and foreign commerce as a means of procuring 
and distributing its victims and 'to prevent panderers 
and procurers from compelling thousands of women and 
girls against their will and desire to enter and continue 
in a life of prostitution'. Such clearly was not the 
situation revealed by the facts of this case" ( 67). 
The Mortensen case, in other words, reveals a revolt against Caminetti. 
The fear of blackmail, the knowledge that Congress intended to eliminate 
white slavery and the lack of compulsion for the pleasure trip made the 
vacation and the trip back innocent. Yet Mortensen was more closely conn-
ected with the business of commercialized vice, since, after all, the 
peti tioners were running a house of prostitution, than were the Caminetti 
cases. 
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If the cross-country pleasure trip of the Mortensens was outside 
the Act, what of a four-block trip within the District of Columbia, paid 
for by the employer of a prostitute? The problem arose in the Beach 
case (6S). The defendant operated a dress shop. She employed a girl as 
her assistant; the girl lived with her and on the suggestion of the def-
endant that the girl could earn more money by 11 selling herself 11 , the girl 
agreed to work for the defendant as a prostitute. The fatal trip was a 
trip in a taxicab paid for by the defendant, who accompanied the girl to 
the Hotel Hamilton, four blocks away from the apartment, for the purpose of 
prostitution. The Circuit Court of Appeals far the District reversed the 
conviction, stating that local laws for the District covered the matter so 
completely that "about the only place in which the act can be done without 
running athwart local law is in an anchored balloon" (69). Chief Justice 
Groner found that the congressional purpose both at the time of the 
' passage of the Mann Act and since, as indicated by local law, was that the 
White Slavery Traffic Act was not to apply within the District except for 
conduct having an interstate aspect. The literal language was against him, 
Chief Justice Groner admitted. 
The Supreme Court thought otherwise. In a majority per curiam opinion, 
it held that 11 Congress, in enacting the Mann Act, made it perfectly clear 
by its Com~dttee Reports ~~~ that it was intended to apply to transportation 
taking place wholly within the District -:H'& 11 • 
The dissent of Justice Murphy was much more direct. He found, and so 
, stated, that there was no white slavery invo 1 ved and that the pro sti tut ion 
was voluntary. 
I t was possible to dispose of the Beach case because of the limited 
-
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point of law raised without rethinking the Caminetti case on its broad 
doctrine that the statute included all acts commonly thought to be sexually 
immoral. Cleveland v. United States (70) permitted no such dodge. The 
defendants were Mormons who believed in and practiced polygamy. They had 
transported plural wives across state lines; prosecution under the Mann Act 
followed. Their convictions were affirmed. 
The majority opinion of Justice Douglas in the Cleveland case proceeds 
along the lines set by the prosecution in Caminetti. The problem was 
the application of "any other immoral purposes". The phrase was not limited 
to sexual relations for hire even though the Act was aimed primarily at 
white-slavery as a business. Prostitution suggested sexual relations for 
hire; not so debauchery. Therefore, under the ejusdem generis rule, while 
the general words could not be used to enlarge the class, they could not 
be more narrowly confined than the class of which they are a part. 
Polygamous practices "have long been branded as immoral in the law >H<*. 
They have been outlawed in our society". They have been branded by the 
court "contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which 
Christianity has produced in the modern world". Religion would not protect 
the defendants; Congress had decided the standard of immorality. VVhile 
the majority opinion does not say so, the test is the wide one of Caminetti. 
The court said it would not 
"stop to re-examine the Caminetti case to determine 
whether the Act was properly applied to the facts there 
presented. But we adhere to its holdings, which has 
been in force for nearly thirty years, that the Act, 
while primarily aimed at the use of interstate commerce 
for the purpose of commercialized sex, is not restricted 
to that end. 11 
The court took the Caminetti doctrine in its widest sweep in the 
'--========='---- --- - --
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Cleveland decision. The dissent of Justice Murphy was to be expected. 
The a ge of the Caminetti case did not justify its continued existence. 
Stare decisis does not require a court to perpetuate a wrong for which 
it was responsible. Moreover, the Caminet ti case could be factually dis-
tinguished. Polygamy was after all a form of marria ge. The form of 
marriage before the court was "basically a cultured institution rooted 
deeply in the religious beliefs and social mores of t hose societies in 
which it appears". It was certainly not in the same genus as "prostitution", 
"debauchery" and words of that type. Presumably, Justices Black and Jackson 
saw a similar distinction, because they also dissented on the grounds that 
"affirmance requires extension of the rule in the Caminetti case and that 
the correctness of that rule is so dubious that it should at least be 
, restricted to its particular facts". 
The problem of the legal process was explicitly discussed in a 
concurring opinion by Justice Rutledge. He did not think it would be 
possible "rationally to reverse the convictions, at the same time adhering 
to the Caminetti and later decisions perpetuating its ruling". He thought 
the Caminetti case had been wrongly decided. At least it had extended the 
Mann Act coverage beyond the congressional intent and purpose, as the 
dissenting opinion convincingly demonstrates. But the Caminetti case 
"has not been overruled and has the force of law until a majority of this 
court may concur in the view that this should be done and take action to 
that effect. "This not having been done, I acquiesce in the Court 1 s 
decision" • He did not say why. 
The history of the Mann Act shows the ambiguity of legislative intent. 
The ambiguity is partly resolved in a decisive interpretation given to the 
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Act in the Caminetti case. The words used by the court in that case are 
not mere dictum. They gave direction to the Act. The direction has been 
followed in later decisions. The restriction thus placed upon the freedom 
of the court to realign cases sets legislative interpretation apart from 
the development of case law. 
The doctrine o f finality for prior decisions setting the course for 
the interpretation of a statute is not always followed. However, to say 
that the matter must be one which involves the Constitution before the 
court may reverse the interpretation of legislation places the responsibil-
ity where it belongs. The path is still open for judicial action if the 
matter is thought vital by a majority of the court. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE PCWER OF JUDGMENT IN . CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 
The written constitution of the United States has been widely dis-
cussed for the power which the Court says it has been given to invalidate 
legislation. In words reminiscent of Chief Justice Marshall's language in 
Marbury v. Madison (71), Justice Roberts explained the process as one in 
which the article of the Constitution is laid beside the statute which it 
challenged. The Court then decides whether the "latter squares with the 
former". "All the Court does, or can do 11 , said Justice Roberts, "is to 
announce its considered judgment upon the question. The only power it has, 
if such it may be called, is the power of judgment. The court neither 
approves nor condemns any legislative policy" (72). 
It can be seen, while the Court neither approves nor condemns in its 
exercise of judgment, it does have to determine whether there is any 
connection between what has been done and one of the great ideals embodied 
in the Constitution. The problem of seeing connection is not so dissimilar 
from passing upon the wisdom of legislation as some have thought. If the 
proposal is ~ne much talked about in the early years of the life of a 
justice, it may be easy for him to see the connection even though the 
proposal appears unwise. It is much more difficult if the proposal appears 
both new and foolish. 
In addition to the power to hold legislative acts invalid, a written 
constitution confers another and perhaps greater power. It is the power 
to disregard prior cases. "The ultimate touchstone of constitutionality 
is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it", Justice 
Frankfurter ,has written (73). The problem of stare decisis where a 
---====~========================~~======~ 
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constitution is involved is therefore an entirely different matter from 
that in case law or legislation. This is often overlooked when the Court 
is condemned for its change of mind. A change of mind from time to time 
is inevitable where there is a written constitution. There can be no 
authoritative interpretation of the Constitution. The Constitution in its 
general provisions embodies the conflicting ideas of the community. Who 
is to say what these ideals mean in any definite way? Certainly not the 
framers, for they did their work when the words were put down. The words, 
' in most instances, are ambigupus. Nor can it be the Court, for the Court 
cannot bind itself in this manner; an appeal can always be made back to 
the Constitution. Moreover, if it is said that the intent of the framers 
ought to control, there is no mechanism for any final determination of 
their intent. Added to the problem ~f ambiguity and the additional -fact 
that the framers may have intended a gro>~ng instrument, there is the 
influence of constitution worship. This influence gives great freedom to 
a court. It can always abandon what has been said in order to go back to 
the written document itself. It is a freedom greater than it would have 
had if no such document existed. The difference in the British practice 
is revealing. But this may say no more than that a written constitution, 
which is frequently thought to give rigidity to a system, must provide 
flexibility if judicial supremacy is to be permitted. 
It may be suggested that the doctrine should be otherwise; that as 
with legislation so with a constitution, the interpretation ought to 
remain fixed in order to permit the people through legislative machinery, 
such as the constitutional convention or the amending process, to make a 
change. But the answer lies not only in the difficulties in obtaining an 
-- __. 
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amendment, nor the difficult position of a court which obdurately refuses 
to interpret common words in a way ordinary citizens believe to be proper. 
The more complete answer is that a written constitution must be enormously 
ambiguous in its general provisions. If there has been an incorrect inter-
!pretation of words, an amendment would come close to repeating the same 
words. 'Nhat is desired is a different emphasis, not different language. 
This is tantamount to saying that 'What is required is a different inter-
pretation rather than amendment. 
I 
II 
Thus, constitutional interpretation cannot be as consistent as case 
law development or the application of statutes. The development proceeds 
in shifts; occasionally there are abrupt changes in direction. Within a 
period and a matter there will be some consi stency. The training of judges 
is reasoning by example in any event and within certain areas cases will be 
compared and developed. Consistency cannot be overlooked entirely. The 
word of Justice Roberts is evidence of that. His change in vote produced 
one of the most dramatic shifts in Supreme Court histo~; yet he later 
complained that too many reversals tend "to bring adjudications of this 
tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket good for this 
day and train only" (74). There will be some consi stency but it is not 
the consistency of case law or statute. 
Diff erences are immediately apparent. Each major concept written into 
the d ocument embodies a number of conflicting i deals. The commerce clause 
for example at different times represents the virtues of home rule and the 
glory of the strength of a nation. The conflicting ideas are represented 
by satellite categories which interpret the written word. No one satellite 
concept can control. The major words writ t en in the document are too 
----~============================================~ 
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ambiguous; the ideals are too conflicting and no interpretation can be 
decisive. The satellite words are handles with a recognition that they 
involve the perennial problems of government; the relationship between 
problems of the person, the state and property ri ghts. In our own system 
the fourth problem of the distribution of powers ·within a federal system 
is added. Case law concepts deal with some of the same problems but less 
obviously. There is an affirmative recognition in a constitutional case 
that the problem is the connection between what is sought to be done and 
the ideals of the community. Connection and consequence must be argued. 
The emphasis on consequence makes the hypothetical example more important. 
Perhaps it is easier for the court to see the connection when the 
problem does not appear controversial. Courts which will rebel against 
taking a step during a controversy (which makes all kinds of hypothetical 
cases seem important), may slide into the same position when a more minor 
matter is involved. The position will be the same if reasoning by example 
later on can make it so. If the problem is to show the connection to the 
court, then the Brandeis brief, which attempts to do that, is less sig-
nificant than the general prior talk and the social studies which have 
already had an effect on the community. To put it another way, the Brandeis 
I brief is important but not so much for the case in which it is used as for 
some later case when its analysis has been accepted by the community. The 
· examples used in the successful brief of the government in the Fair Labor 
Standards Case were similar and sometimes identical to t hose used in t he 
unsuccessful brief in the Child Labor case. It was the community, not the 
briefs, that had changed. 
The consequence of this is that a constitution cannot prevent change; 
-- --
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indeed, by permitting an appeal to the constitution, the discretion of the 
court is increased and change made possible. The possible result of this 
in some fields may seem alarming. It is only a reminder, however, that 
"ultimate protection is to be found in the people themselves 11 (75). 
The development in the application of a constitutional provision may 
be sho•vn in terms of the power of the federal government to prohibit 
commerce. This was the constitutional problem raised by the Mann Act. 
In handling this problem, the satellite concept of illicit commodities 
developed. The concept itself is revealing, for as will be seen, an illicit 
commodity is only an instance of a case where the court is able to see 
the connection between the regulation or prohibition and the ideals of the 
community. Because the court has been able to see the connection for some 
items, reasoning by example has then been able to extend the category. The 
analogy to diseased cattle and to lottery tickets in the debate on the 
Mann Act was not intended to be humorous. Present day mini mum wage and 
hour legislation owes its existence in some measure to diseased cattle, 
drunkards, defrauders, prostitutes, auto-thieves, kidnappers and convicts 
and to those who sought to control them. 
The Constj_ tution does not say that Congress may "preserve the morals 
of the community by making it unlawful to transport women across a state 
line for immoral purposes" (76). The language is simple and ambiguous: 
"The Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce ·with foreign nations 
and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes". In the absence 
of some mechanism for achieving an authoritative determination, neither the 
literal meaning nor the intention of the framers can be decisive. Even if 
the words were to be applied in accordance with the meaning they had when 
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written, they could be given a broad or narrow application. In later years 
"among" in its context has carried the connotation of "between", but 
throughout the period it also meant "intermingled ¥lith" (77) -- a term 
which might preserve or obliterate the power of the states. Commerce 
might have been used to "refer to the entire moneyed economy -- to the 
processes by which men obtain money, whether by the production or manu-
facture of goods for sale or by the exchange of goods produced by others" (78). 
It may have been used to include 11the marketing of the products after the 
processing has been completed" and not "manufacturing, mining or agriculture 
as such 11 ( 79). Perhaps it was broad enough to include tte movement of 
goods as part of traffic, even though the goods were not what would be 
termed commercial today. 
To some extent the understanding of the framers of the Constitution 
must have been to have a national government able to operate in "all cases 
where the States are incompetent" or "in which the harmony of the United 
States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation". This 
was the Sixth Virginia Resolution and it was adopted by the Convention. 
The delegation of power to the federal government in the commerce clause, 
except for the word "among" which may make all the difference, bears a 
close resemblance to the defeated New Jersey Plan which was said to give 
to the national government "additional powers in a few cases only" ( 80). 
It has been urged that the commerce clause was "a negative and pre-
·Ventative. provision" intended to bring about "freedom of commercial inter-
course" by removing barriers placed by the states but without any grant of 
power to Congress itself "to prohibit corrunerce in legitimate articles" (81). 
The separate provisions prohibiting the states from levying "any imposts or 
--- --=~--=:.;:;.====================~- --
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duties on imports or exports" and the failure to deny to Congress the ri.ght 
to prohibit from commerce the products of slave labor have been argued, 
in the one case for and in the· latter instance against, a broad inter-
pretation of the commerce clause (82). To the necessary ambiguity of word 
and intention must be added the knowledge tha t some of the framers at least 
were aware that "there ought to be a capacity to provide for future contin-
gencies" (83). Perhaps they expected the words to chang e their meanings 
as exigencies arose. 
A decisive interpretation was required to resolve the ambiguity. A 
broad and compelling reason was given by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. 
Ogden. The case concerned the right of New York to grant a monopoly of 
the right to use steam navigation within its territorial waters and thus 
raised the problem of whether commerce included navigation and, in context 
of this case, conferred exclusive power on the federal government. In 
stating that it did, Marshall said: 
"The subject to be r egulated is colii!l'erce ~H:~-. The counsel 
for the appellee would limit it to traffic, to buyi ng and 
selling, . or the interchange of commodities and do not admit 
that it comprehends navigation. This would restrict a 
general term, applic able to many objects, to one of its 
significations. Commerce undoubtedly is traffic, but it 
is something more; it is intercourse. It describes the 
commercial intercourse between nations and parts of nations, 
in all of its branches, and is regulated by prescribi ng 
rules for carrying on t hat intercourse" (84). 
With navigation included within t he field of commercial intercourse, 
the problem was what was reserved for the states. The dividing line was 
given in these t erms: 
"The genius and character of the whole government seems 
to be, that its actions is to be applied to all the 
external concerns of the nation, but not to t hose which 
are completely within a particular State, which do not 
affect other St ate s and with which it is not necessary 
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to interfere, for the purpose of the government. The 
completely internal commerce of a state, then, may be 
considered as reserved for the state itself". 
The states had the power to enact inspection and health laws, which 
came to be classified generally as police measures; the national govern-
ment had the power to control that commercial intercourse which concerned 
more states than one. But even the broad interpretation by Marshall left 
much ambiguity. Apparently it might be possible for a state to assert 
a police regulation over a matter from which a different point of view 
involved commerce among the st ates. The Chief Justice did not feel com-
pelled to answer what would be the result if New York, for example, were 
to have granted a monopoly within its territorial waters, in the absence 
of any federal regulation whatsoever over the subj ect. Yet the direction 
in favor of national power was clear. Already satellite concepts were 
at work. The federal gpvernment could regulate if the item were included 
within commercial intercourse, the exchan~ of commodities or navigation 
among the states. The individual state had power to regulate if the item 
could be classified as a matter for inspection or health or a police 
regulation. Reasoning by example would work within these categories and 
would create new ones. 
These problems were important in the eighty-nine year span between 
Gibbons v. Ogden and the consideration of the Mann Act. They were 1) what 
items and articles were to be considered as a part of the traffic of comm-
lercial intercourse; 2) what activities were likely to fall within that 
area which concerns more states than one and, therefore, ~dthin the orbit 
of the federal government; and, 3) to what extent the power to regulate 
includes the power to exclude or prohibit. The facts of Gibbons v. Ogden 
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gave only partial answers. To be sure, navigation was included within 
commerce. Universal understanding in .~erica put it there, Marshall said. 
However, there was no answer from the facts as to whether or not the 
federal government might prohibit navigation. ·what of the items or articles 
which might be considered as a part of the traffic? Did they include 
persons? This would be important later on in connection with the Mann Act. 
It hac;l been argued that one who carried passengers could not insist that 
the activity was within the commerce which Congress alone might regulate. 
Chief Justice Marshall said, "no clear distinction is perceived between 
the power to regulate vessels in transporting men for hire and property 
, for hire". The facts of the case however dealt with the regulation of 
I 
vessels carrying persons as items of traffic; persons as traffic were 
involved only in a limited sense. 
Thirteen years later, when the Court in The Mayor v. Miln (85) passed 
upon a regulation of New York requiring the masters of vessels arriving 
from foreign ports to give detailed reports on the passengers, a change 
in the meaning of the categories was already apparent. The act, the court 
said, was not "a regulation of commerce but of police". Beyond that, while 
goods were the subject of commerce, the persons were not (86). Perhaps 
more important, Justice Barbour said, 
"We think it is as competent and as necessary for a state 
to provide precautionary measures against the moral 
pestilence of paupers, vagabonds and possible convicts, 
as it is to guard against the physical pestilence which 
may arise from unsound and infectious articles incorporated 
from a ship, the crew of which may be laboring under an 
infectious disease". 
The category of moral pestilence is thus announced as a way of con-
struing the Constitution along with commercial intercourse, navigation and 
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police regulation. 
However, when New York and Massachusetts at t empted to go further 
and to collect fees r ather than reports for incoming passengers, the Court 
showed the majority had not meant that persons might not be articles of 
commerce. The acts were unconstitutional (87). 1'!!' . Justice Wayne said, 
"But I have said the states have the right to turn off 
paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice and the 
states where slaves are has a constitutional ri ght to 
exclude all such as are, from a common ancestry and 
country, of the same class of men. And when Congress 
shall legislate, if it be disrespectful for one who is 
a member of the j udiciary to suppose so absurd a thing 
of another department of the government -- to make 
paupers, vagabonds, suspected persons and fugitives 
from justice subjects of admission to the United States, 
I do not doubt it will be found and declared, should it 
ever become a matter for judi cial decis ion, that such 
persons are not within the regulating power which t he 
United States have over commerce. Paupers, vagabonds 
and fugitives never have been subject of rightful na tional 
intercourse, or of commercial regulation, except in the 
transportation of them to distant colonies to get rid 
of them, or for punishment as convicts. They have no 
rights of national intercourse; no one has a ri ght to 
transport them, without authority of law, from where 
they are to any other place and t heir only right s where 
they may be are such as the law gives to all men who 
have not altogether forfeited its protection" (88 ) . 
Moral pestilence, in other words, was a most important category. I t 
mi ght be double-edged. It mi ght permit the states to regulate or exclude 
items of traffic which otherwise could be controlled only by the federal 
government. Perhaps this was only an extension of the idea of a police 
regulation. It seemed so obvious to Justice Wayne that the safety of the 
local community meant paupers, vagabonds and suspected p ersons could be 
kept out, that it was a mat t er of disrespect to the f ederal le gislature to 
think it would ever try t o let them in. But the other edge of the idea 
mi ght be that the federal government, if i ndeed it could not let such 
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supposed carriers of moral pestilence in, could also lend its aid in 
keeping them out. If the United States were to do this, who could complain? 
Sure~y not the persons regulated or the persons who sought to bring them 
in, for the persons so tainted "have no rights of national intercourse; 
no one has a right to transport them, without authority of law ~**"• 
Moral pestilence then might be a most important category. It could operate 
to confer governmental authority both on the states and on the federal 
government. An item might appear to be excluded from the commerce power 
for one reason or another and yet be restored to it if it were a matter 
of moral pestilence. 
The idea of moral pestilence, which soon would go by other names as 
, well, would become increasingly important if the items covered by the 
commerce clause were to be thought of normally as articles valuable for 
barter and sale. Commercial intercourse might well seem to carry that 
connotation. Something of this reasoning in fact was behind the recurring 
idea, which was soon to vanish, that persons were not the subject of comm-
erce. In a sense, persons were like insurance contracts, which the Court 
in 1868 proceeded to say "are not subjects of trade and barter offered in 
the market as something having an existence and value independent of the 
parties to them. They are not commodities to be shipped or forwarded from 
one state to another and there put up for sale" (89). A court reluctant 
to confer federal power could narrow the category of arti cles of commerce. 
Trade marks might be the symbols by which men engage in trade and manufact-
ure, but that did not mean they were clearly within the commerce power. 
"Every species of property", the Court pointed out (90), 
11which is the subject of commerce, or which is used or 
even essential in commerce is not brought by this clause 
within the control of Congress. The barrels and casks, 
-- -
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the bottles and boxes in which alone certain articles 
of commerce are kept for safety and by which their contents 
are transferred from the seller to the buyer, do not 
thereby become the subject of congressional legislation 
more than other property". 
The language reflects a shift away from the broad powers which might 
have been conferred by Gibbons v. Ogden. In the face of such a shift, 
perhaps the category of moral pestilence might be used to restore the 
power to govern. Perhaps it could be joined with a concept carried by 
other cases, namely, that of "business affected with a public interest", 
and some larger category eventually formed as a vehicle for interpreting 
both commerce and due process. The category then could have in it not 
only paupers and fugitives but grain and other necessities. 
The satellite concepts so far were principally commercial intercourse, 
the exchange of comnodities and navigation or transportation on : one side 
and inspection, health and police regulations on the other. The category 
of moral pestilence did not yet include many items. In a shift away from 
federal authority, greater emphasis had been placed on the necessity that 
the commodities regulated be themselves the articles of value which were 
bought and sold. The case of Kidd v. Pearson (91), added another popular 
category calculated to interpret the commerce clause in such a way as to 
cut down the power of the federal government. Iowa had proceeded to 
regulate the manufacturing of intoxicating liquors, and it did so without 
regard to the intention of the manufacturer to export the product. The 
article regulated was one to which moral pestilence has sometimes been 
thought attached. The rule could have been put merely in terms of a police 
regulation. However, Mr. Justice Lamar phrased it this way: 11 No distinc-
tion is more popular to the common mind, or more clearly eA~ressed in 
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economic and political literature than that between manufacture and commerce". 
Undoubtedly, Justice Lamar had as much right to rely on a distinction 
popular to the common mind as Chief Justice ~furshall had to rely on the 
universal understanding in Gibbons v. Ogden. 
The language of Kidd v. Pearson was used to popularize a new dividing 
category. Manufacture, as with the regulation of grain, was a "thing of 
domestic concern". Commerce anong the states was now to be referred to as 
"interstate", including as examples navigation or transportation. Soon it 
would be viewed conceptually as a "flow" across state lines. It had already 
come to include t h ousands of persons crossing on a bridge connecting two 
states(92). The phrase "interstate commerce" itself incorporated the dis-
tinction between manufacture and commerce (93). Interstate commerce 
involved articles "bought, sold or exchanged for the purpose of -:H**lH<-'H<-
transit" (94). Interstate commerce did not include, for example, the 
activities of businessmen in controlling the refining of sugar in the 
United States because "commerce succeeds to manufacture and is not a part 
of it" (95). There, the interference with interstate commerce in such a 
case was at least not direct. Manufacture as against commerce could be a 
way of talking about indirect as a gainst direct. Thus, two new classifying 
words were added. 
The satellite concepts developed for the interpretation of the 
conurerce clause were numerous. To some extent they duplicated each other, 
as for example the rule of manufacturing and the rule of indirect, which for 
a time seemed to mean the sane thing. However, all in all the categories 
were a way of comparing cases from different points of view. The problem 
of what federal regulation was to be permit t ed did involve the relation-
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ships in a nation between the person, the state and property, and, in a 
paramount way for the commerce clause, the distribution of powers between 
the national and the local government. The categories reflected these 
concerns, but they did so by offering comparison of cases on the basis 
of what types of property were involved; where did the action take place; 
what was the act - for example, was it transportation - and what was the 
motive or int en~ of the actor? 
Among the array of concepts there was the category of moral pestilence. 
It might not only divide state from federal power. Perhaps it would confer 
power on both. Justice Harlan had faintly sug~ested the approach in his 
dissent in the Knight case (96). He spoke the language of effect on the 
buying and selling of articles which go into interstate commerce as opposed 
1 to manufacture. But he did more. This was no attempt, he said, "to strike 
at the manufacture simply of articles that are le gitimate or recognized 
subjects of COI'IliOOrce". The point was somewhat more explicit in Reid v. 
Colorado (97). The defendant had shipped cattle into Col orado without 
having them first inspected as required by the law of that state. The 
defense was that the shipment was a matter of interstate commerce and under 
the Constitution not to be regulated by the state. The ansVler was given 
by Justice Harlan not solely on the basis that Congress had not "covered 
the whole subject of transportation of live stock". 
"The defendant", Justice Harlan wrote, "is not given 
by that instrument the right to introduce into a 
state, against its will, live stock affected by a 
contagious, infectious or communicable disease 
(even though the particular live stock may not have 
been so affected), and whose presence in the state 
will or may be injurious to its domestic animals". 
The position was in the tradition of Justice Wayne's dictum dealing 
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with paupers, vagabonds and fugitives. 
The Federal Lottery Act (98) attempted to prohibit the carrying of any 
lottery ticket from one state to another. Perhaps its constitutionality 
under the commerce clause could rest on the concept of transportation 
since the tickets were carried interstate. Nevertheless , the regulation 
was over commercial articles; and was not a lottery ticket like an insur-
ance policy, - contingent and not in itself an i tern of bar ter and sale? 
If a lottery ticket were not a commercial article and the point was made 
by Chi ef Justice Fuller in his dissent (99), howwas it possible 11to 
transform a non-commercial article into a commercial one simply because it 
is transported, as, for example, an invitation to dine or take a drive?" 
"The power to prohibit the transportation of diseased animals and 
infected goods over railroads 11 was di f ferent, 11 for they would be in them-
selves injurious to the transaction of interstate commerce and, moreover, 
are essentially commercial in their nature 11 , but "nobody", according to the 
Chief Justice, "would pretend that persons could be kept off trains because 
they were going from one state to another to engage in the lottery business". 
'The commerce clause could not be enlarged to take care of lotteries. 
"In countries whose fundamental law is flexible, 
it may be that the homely maxim, 1 to ease the shoes where 
it pinches', may be applied, but under the Constitution 
of the United States, it cannot be availed of to 
justify action by Congress or by the courts 11 • 
The case was difficult; it had to be argued three times. Not only 
did the statute regulate traffic in an article arguably non-commercial, 
but the regulation was to prohibit (100). The majority opinion by Justice 
Harlan spoke of "the widespread pestilence of lotteries". I~ otteries, once 
favored, had "grown into disrepute" and "become offensive to the entire 
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people of the Nation". The tickets were subjects of traffic and therefore 
of commerce. If there were doubts as to the power to prohibit, 
"what clause can be cited which in any degree, 
countenances the suggestion that one may, of rigpt, 
carry or cause to be carried from one State to 
another that which will harm the public morals?rt 
The act was constitutional, even though some mi ght argue that this 
would mean "Congress may arbitrarily exclude from commerce among the 
states any article, commodity or thing, of wh atever kind or nature, or 
however useful or valuable, which it may choose -: :--r--* 11 • 
Lottery tickets could have been regarded as symbols of local activity 
similar to manufacturing and pa r ticularly suited for state regulation. 
But "we should hesitate long," wrote Jus tice Harlan, "before a d judging 
that an evil of such appalling character, carried on through interstate 
com~erce cannot be met and crushed by the only power competent to that 
end". The rule of evil of appalling character as a basis for national 
action was not as broad as that suggested by Gibbons v. Ogden; even so, 
it was suggested that the rule would have to be narrowly confined to the 
regulation of things "useless or inherently harmful". (101 ) . 
These ~~re the years immediately before the passage and constitutional 
test of the White Slave Traffic Act. No one concept could preempt the 
interpretation of the commerce clause. The language was that of direct 
or indirect, commerce was transportation and becoming a "current"; the 
nature of the article regulated was important. Any argument couched in 
one concept could be answered in another. Nor could one interpret the 
commerce clause by itself; the Fifth Amendment could be urged, and now 
the Tenth. How much persuasion the concepts exercised then is difficult 
to tell. They were a result as well as a cause - indicating whether the 
-~-
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court saw or failed to see importance and relationship. Nevertheless, 
the concepts would have persuasive influence and the cases decided with 
them would be of great importance for reasoning by example. For this 
reason, the Lottery Cases were important. ,~ pestilence seen there had 
suggested a rule concerning public morals. Other things could be compared 
to lotteries. 
Harlan, himself, was back on the rule of direct or indirect the 
following year in applying the Sherman Act to common stock ownership 
through a holding company of two somewhat competitive railroads (102). 
He was answered by Justice 1Nhite in a dissent raising the flag on the 
• 
Tenth Amendment, although White, the same year, saw no difficulty with the 
imposition of a federal tax which could "destroy the business of manu-
facturing oleomargarine". Perhaps the obvious difference was that oleo-
margarine tended to 11decei ve the public 11 • The dissent wa.s ambiguously 
concurred in by Holmes, who then, on his own accord, admitted that Congress 
might regulate an instrument of commerce whose effect was only indirect, 
but this was to be reserved for "heroic measures". Strangely enough for 
Justice Holmes, the intent of Congress seemed to have a bearing of the 
interpretation of com~erce, for if the intent was, through the anti-
monopoly law, to "disintegrate society so far as it could to individual 
atoms", then "calling such a law a regula tion of commerce was a mere 
pretense 11 • It would 'IDe "an attempt to reconstruct society", and "Congress 
was not entrusted by the Constitution with the power to make it ~HHl-tt. 
Nevertheless, it was Holmes who weakened the rule of direct by adding 
words to it. He applied the Sherman Act to a combination of packers (103). 
Commerce among the states was "not a technical legal conception but a 
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practical one, drawn from the cours e of business". The movement of cattle 
affected was a "recurring course" or a "current" and therefore commerce. 
The effect on comrrerce was direct; it was not "secondary, remote or merely 
probable"· 
The court looked at social reforms reluctantly. I t took pains to 
state that the Tenth Amendment p revented the national gover nment "under the 
pressure of a supposed general welfare" from attempting to exercise powers 
not granted (104 ) . It held unconstitutional the First Employers' Liability 
Act because it was applicable to shop employees. Even Holmes seemed to 
agree with this narrow interpretation of the corrunerce clause (105 ) . The 
government in its amicus brief had argued, and thus on the consti tutional 
point really conceded, that "the act would no more apply to a purely local 
l i ne of the company than to any other business, - the mining of coal, for 
instance -::"**". Harlan, who had seen appalling evils in lotteries~ and 
therefore the existence of national power, saw no such connection between 
"i nterstate commerce" and the right to rrembership in a labor or ganization 
as to authorize Congress to make it a crime against the United States for 
an agent for an interstate carrier to discharge an employee because of 
such membership (106). The attempt of Congress to force the separation of 
coal mines from ownership by those railroads who transported t he coal had 
to be cut down (107). The railroad could comply by selling the coal they 
had mined; then ownership of the mine and later transportation would be 
permitted. Otherwise, serious constitutional objections would be present, 
among them the argument that the regulation prohibited. There was some 
acquiescence by the Court in federal regulations. 1linimum-hour legislation 
f or railroad employees "connected with the movement of trains in inter-
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state transportation" (108) and safety regulations applicable to railroad 
cars which moved not only in interstate but intrastate commerce as well 
were upheld, but this was only because safety and movement seemed 
apparent (109). 
It was so much easier when it came to something like the Pure Food and 
Drug Act. The act was severe. It prohibited the introduction into any 
state or territory, from any other state or territo~ of any article of 
food or drug which is adulterated. It was applied to cans of eggs, adul-
terated because they contained a quantity of boric acid (110). The court 
took the act in its stride. "We are dealing," said Justice McKenna, 11it 
must be remembered, with illicit articles - articles which the law seeks to 
keep out of commerce -lHPA- 11 • There is here no conflict of national and state 
jurisdictions over property legally articles of trade. The question here 
is whether articles which are outlaws of commerce may be seized wherever 
found and it certainly will not be contended that they are outside the 
jurisdiction of the national government when they are within the borders 
of a state. The power to outlaw articles of commerce was a restatement of 
moral pestilence (111). 
It was against this background that the court considered the consti-
tutionality of the Mann Act in Hoke and Economides v. United States (112). 
The act sought to prohibit the transportation of any woman or girl in 
interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery or for 
any other immoral purpose. The defendant argued that "the power to regulate 
commerce does not confer upon Congress the power to regulate the morality 
or any other immorality -:H~- of citizens individually". It was pointed out 
that immorality was a "phrase broad enough to reach drinking, gambling, 
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exposure of p erson, fighting, lying, profanity - in fact, any frailty which 
the flesh is heir to". And even though "prostitutes, both male and female" 
are 11 generally and j ustly deemed immoral" they 
"are citizens of their respective states, 
with all the privileges and immunities possessed 
by any other citizens and one of their privileges 
is the right to travel interstate, regardless of 
moral or immoral intent at t he end of t he trip". 
Moreover, persons were not the subject of corrurerce and it was up to 
the states, in accordance with their reserved powers, to deal with such 
l ocal matters as morals and prostitution. 
No trace of dif ficulty is to be found in Justice McKenna. I n the 
first place, the language of the Constitution was clear . 
11 Congress is given power 1to regul ate commerce 
with foreign nations and among the several states t. 
The power is direct; t here is no word of l imitation 
in it, and its broad and universal scope has been 
so often declared as to make repetition unnecessary. 
Besi des, it has had so much illustration by way 
of cases that it would seem as if t here could be 
no instance of its exercise that does not find 
an admitted example in some one of them11 • 
Unfortunately, "experience, however, is the other 
way, and in almost every instance of the exercise 
of the power differences are asserted from previous 
exercises of it and made a ground of attack. The 
present case is an example 11 • 
The regulation was like that exercised in the Lottery Cases, and 
over debased and adulterated articles. 
"Let an articl e be debased by adulteration, let 
it be misrepresented by f alse branding, and 
Congress may exercise its prohibitive power. 
It may be that Congress could not prohibit in all 
of its condi tions its sale within a state. However, 
Congress may prohibit its transportation between 
the St ates and by that means defeat t he motive and 
evils of its manufacture. Congress had the power 
to prohibit outlaws of commerce. But it is asserted 
that such being the ri ght, another cannot be made 
guilty of the crime of inducing or assisting 
in the exercise of it and 'that the motive or 
intention of the passengers, either before 
beginning the journey, or during or after 
completing it, is not a matter of interstate 
commerce. 1 The contentions confound things 
important to be distinguished. It urges a 
right exercised in morality to sustain a 
right to be exercised in immorality. It is 
· misleading to say that men and women have 
rights. Their ri ghts cannot fortify or 
sanction their wrongs; and if they employ 
interstate transportation as a facility of 
their wrongs, it ma,y be forbidden to them. 11 
The analogy of these cases was not affected, it was said, because 
women were not articles of commerce or merchandise. "The substance of 
· the Congressional power is the same. 11 It was too bad that Chief Justice 
Fuller was not around to see that "persons could be kept off trains 
because they were going from one state to another to en gage" in something 
at least like the lottery business. 
It was one thing to justify an act which sought to prevent the use 
of women as unwilling articles of trade; it was perhaps quite different 
to justify under the commerce power a prohibition against interstate 
movement by seekers after illicit pleasure. It would be at least more 
outside a word intended to "refer to the entire moneyed economy • 11 The 
argument advanced by the government in the Hoke case, to be sure, was 
broad enough to cover both, placed as it was on public morals as disting-
uished from the economic affairs of the people. The dissent by Justice 
Lamar in the Holte case (113), where the woman was cooperative, takes a 
somewhat different turn, however. He suggested and Justice Day concurred, 
that if she were "voluntarily travelling on her own account", she would 
then "cease to be an object of transportation." The argument was a throw-
back to the old view that persons were not the subject of traffic. One 
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might recall the language of Justice Barbour and Justice Wayne and suggest 
that the more willing and the more immoral, the more subject to prohibition 
the traffic would be. At all events, the arguments were again advanced 
in Caminetti; (114) the court responded by stating that uthe authority of 
Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and 
injurious uses -lH~r.- is no longer open to question. 11 At least where a moral 
pestilence was involved, commerce was not a matter solely of economics. 
From the prohibition of white slavery, which, of course, did not mean 
white slavery, it was an easy step to the prohibition of foreign imports 
of prize-fight pictures (115). It was a small step to the closing of inter-
' state commerce to false and fraudulently branded articles (116). Yet here 
the article mi ght be harmless in itself. How could Congress close the channels 
of commerce to innocent merchandise? The argument had been advanced in 
the Tobacco case (117), without even winning a retort from the court. 
Possibly, the answer there was along the lines suggested by Harlen in the 
Knight case. Even innocent articles might be considered infected with 
the odium of monopoly and restraint. And so here Justice Hughes now 
explained: 
"Referring to the nature of the statements 
which are within the purview of the amendment 
(the misbranding clause of the Food and Drug 
Act), it is said that a distinction should 
be taken between articles that are illicit, 
immoral or harmful and those which are 
legitimate -lHH~. But the question remains 
as to what may be regarded as 'illicit' and 
we find no ground for saying that Congress 
may not condemn the interstate transportation 
of swindling preparations, designed to cheat 
credulous sufferers and make such preparations, 
accompani ed by false and fraudulent statements, 
illicit with respect to interstate commerce, as 
well as, for ex?Jnple, lottery tickets ~~- ~~~(- . 
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The false and fraudulent statement, which the 
amendment describes, accompanies the article in 
the package and thus gives to the article its 
character in interstate commerce" (118). 
Thus, by the use of adjectives, subjects could be made bad. Was 
there no limit to the articles which could be thus condemned, and as to 
which, in fact, all other distinctions dropped away, as, for example, the 
distinction between manufacture and commerce? Justice Hughes suggested 
an answer: 
"Finally the statute is attacked upon the ground 
that it enters the domain of speculation ~HH:-. We think 
that this objection proceeds upon a misconstruction 
of the provision. Congress deliberately excluded 
the field where there are honest differences of 
opinion between schools and practitioners ~HH~. It 
was plainly to leave no doubt upon this point 
that t he words 1 false and fraudulent I were used -:HH~ . 
Congress recognized that there was a wide field 
in which assertions as to curative effect are in no 
sense honest expressions of opinion and constitute 
absolute falsehood and in the nature of the case 
can be deemed to have been made only with fraudulent 
purpose" (119). 
Perhaps this was the very center of the problem of interpretation. 
It questioned the role of the expert. It might deny authority where there 
was an honest difference of opinion and wait for the time when there was 
that universal understanding to which Marshall referred, or the assumed 
unanimous reaction which Harlan de scribed when lotteries were condemned 
as "offensive to the entire nation". 
In dealing with a case involving intoxicating liquor, Justice Vlhite 
explicitly made the category of articles transported controlling . Since 
the act of Congress in this case was in aid of state regulation, the argu-
ment had been advanced that to permit "state prohibitions to attach to the 
movement of intoxicants lays the basis for subjecting interstate commerce 
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in all articles to state control, and therefore destroys the Constitution". 
The want of force in the argument White said, 
"becomes patent by considering the principle 
which, after all, dominates and controls the 
question here presented; that is, the subject 
regulated and the extreme power to which that 
subject may be subjected. In other words, the 
exceptional nature of the subject here regulated 
is the basis upon which the exceptional power 
exerted must rest ~H<-. 
In Wilson v. New (120), White permitted federal regulation of bonus 
and wages of railroad employees en gaged in interstate commerce against 
tre background of a threatened strike which would have caused "the entire 
interruption11 of that commerce. He spoke of the difference in the power 
of regulation 11which may be exerted as to flour, dry-goods and other 
commodities". The difference was shovm 
"by the settled doctrine sustaining the right by 
regulation absolutely to prohibit lottery tickets 
and by the obvious consideration that such rights 
to prohibit could not be applied to pig iron, 
steel rails or most of the vast body of comrnodities 11 • 
The categories were not, however, unchangeably fixed, for White took 
account of the threatened strike, not as bearing on the type of regulation 
permitted but on the power itself. It was a view in some contrast to the 
' dissent of Justj_ce Pitney, who in words reminiscent of Chief Justice Fuller 
explained, 11 The suggestion that it was passed to prevent a threatened 
strike, and in this sense to remove an obstruction from the path of commerce, 
while true in fact is immaterial in law". 
The Child Labor Act in 1917 provided a severe test for the meaning 
of the category of illicit articles (121). The act was to operate under 
the commerce clause by keeping out of interstate commerce commodities made 
in establishments in which, 
If 
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"children under the age of fourteen years have 
been employed or permitted to work, or children 
between the age of fourteen years and sixteen· 
years have been employed or permitted to work 
more than eigh t hours in any day, or more than 
six days in any week". 
Certainly the interpretation of the commerce clause was not then 
pre-empted by a category of illicit commodities. The clause had been 
applied to regulate unfair competition or monopolies. It had come to be 
identified more and more with transportation and as such it permitted the 
federal power to regulate the use of safety devices and rates in intra-
state commerce where the effect was interstate. Yet the most promising 
justification for the act was that child labor was child slavery and 
similar to white slavery and that the products of child labor were like 
lottery tickets, intoxicating liquor, adulterated articles and goods 
misrepresented. 
The government argued that child labor was "in and of itself immoral 
in character" and that child labor was ''child slavery". Its effects were 
to be found in dwarfed bodies and minds. A change in public opinion 
regarding child labor had occurred "like t hat in relation to lottery 
tickets " . Whether the articles produced by child labor were good or bad 
would have to be judged by their effect. 1nsbranded food might be whole-
some. While the manufacture in which child labor was used might seem 
local, "nothing is more essentially a local matter than prostitution". The 
regulation of Congress was to protect citizens in receiving states and to 
protect the health of persons in competing states (122). 
The complainant, who had filed a bill in equity on behalf of himself 
and two minor sons to enjoin the enforcement of the act, argued that it was 
sometimes good for a young man to act. For example, hi s f ailure to work 
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may result in starvation for his mother and sister (123). The power of 
Congress to restrict or prohibit could only be used when there was a 
"real evil and injury involved in and attendant upon t he commerce i t self" (124). 
' The lottery, pure food and drug and white slave cases involved this utiliza-
tion of commerce itself. But "the product of a factory is not unsanitary 
or adulterated or unwholesome because it ha s been touched during the 
process of manufacture by a child 1 s hand" (125). 
11It is not once suggested that the man who 
consumes the product of child l abor i s guilty 
of an immoral act, as, of course, he is not. 
Immorality being thus eliminated and unwhole-
someness having already been eliminated, it 
occurs to us this statement of a national 
interest is f anc i ful and far fetched" (126). 
The argument stressed t he consequence of permitting the regulation. 
In a five to four cesision, the court, speaking through ,Justice Day, held 
the act uhconstitutional. The matter sought to be regulated, the production 
of a r ticles, was a matter of local regulation, saved for the states by the 
Tenth Amendment. Commerce was intercourse and t r affic. It included the 
transportation of pe rsons and property but it did not include such items 
as coal mining and manufacture. There was no authority to prohibit the 
movement of ordinar y commodities. The lottery tickets, adulterated art i cles 
and women to be used for immoral purposes were dif f erent. As to them, 
"the authority to prohibit " was "but the power to regulate " . In each one 
of those cases, "the use of interstate transportation was neces sar y for 
t he accomplishment of harmful results". In other words, although the power 
over interstate trans portation was to regulate, that could only be ace-
ornplished by prohibiting the us e of the facilities of interstate commerce 
to affect the evil intended. Here there apparently was no such use of 
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commerce. The goods "shipped are of themselves harmless''. 
Justice Holmes did not agree. The lottery case showed that commerce 
might be prohibited. And this might be done even though the indirect 
effect was to regulate a local matter, as with the Mann Act, the Pure 
Food and Drug Act and the tax on oleomargarine. 
"The notion that prohibi tion is any less 
prohibition when applied to things now t hought 
evil I do not understand. But if t here is any 
matter upon which civilized countries have agreed -
far more unanimously than they have with regard 
to intoxicants and some other matters over which 
this country is now emotionally aroused - it is 
the evil of premature and excessive child labor". 
The simple and ambiguous commerce clause was thus interpreted by 
made-up concepts of equal stature: direct as against indirect; transpor-
tation, a current, a flow as against local manufacture. North Dakota 
could not impose regulations on grain bought in the state for shipment and 
sale in the Minneapolis market (127). The "course of business ~~f-r.- fixed 
and determined the interstate character of the transaction". The federal 
government could regulate the stockyards, despite the Hopkins case, because 
11 the stockyards are but a throat through which the current flows and the 
transactions which occur therein are only incident to this current from the 
West to the East and from one state to another" (12S). A strike of coal 
miners would not be a matter of interstate commerce but it could be made 
so if intention and plan made it have a "direct, material and substantial 
eff ect to restrain" that commerce (129). There was, in addition, the 
category of illicit commodities, despite the setback of the Child Labor 
case . The category would apply when the court was sufficiently il,lipressed 
with some evil, occuring perhaps only after the transportation had 
ceased, to think of the evil in connection with the commodity. Within a 
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year after the Child Labor case (130) the court had no difficulty in 
upholding a statute prohibiting the order, purchase or transportation of 
intoxicating liquor into a state where the manufacture or sale of the liquor 
was against the local law. 
The National Motor Vehicle Theft Act gave the category new meaning (131). 
It made it a criminal offense to transport in interstate commerce a motor 
vehicle known to be stolen. Surely an automobile, even though stolen, is 
unobjectional. The point was made by the attorney for the defendant and 
with it this statement: uwe think that when this c curt upheld the con-
stitutionality of the White Slave Law -lK-l< and likewise the Pur e Food and 
Drug Act -lHH< also the Anti-Lottery .4ct ~HH< it went to the very extreme 
; limit which we may ever expect it to go" (132). The brief made it clear 
that counsel thought that the court had alrea~y gone too far. It was 
"altogether too late to argue", the government rejoined, 
"That while congress may forbid under penalty 
the transportation in interstate commerce of an 
objectionable woman merely because of immoral 
purposes of the man in effecting her trans-
portation, Congress is powerless to close the 
channels of such commerce to the transportation 
of vehicles known to mve been stolen" (133). 
The court, through Chief Justice Taft, agreed with the government. 
The rule was stated broadly: 
"Congress can certainly regulate interstate 
commerce to the extent of forbidding and 
punishing the use of such commerce as an 
agency to promote immorality, dishonesty or the 
spread of any evil or harm to the people of other 
st ates from the state of origin. I n doing this, 
it is merely exercising the police power for the 
benefit of the public within the field of inter-
state commerce" (134 ) . 
The Chief Justice showed that the Child Labor case was different. 
II 
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11 Articles rna de by child la bar and transported 
into other states were harmless and could be 
properly transported, without injuring any 
person who bought or used t hem". 
The illicit article cases, on the other hand, were cases where 
"the use of interstate corrunerce had contributed 
to the accomplishment of harrnful results to 
people of other states, and -lHH<- the Congressional 
power over interstate transport ation in such 
cases could only be effectively exercised by 
prohibiting it". 
In fact, it appeared that the invention of the automobile itself 
was t o blame: 
11 It is known of all men that the radical change 
in transportation of persons and g oods effected 
by the introduction of the automobile, the 
speed with which it moves, and the ease with 
which evil minded persons can avoid capture, 
have greatly encouraged and increased crimes. 
One of the crimes which have been encouraged 
is t he theft of the automobiles themselves and 
their immediate transport ation to places remote 
from homes of the owner. Elaborately organized 
conspiracies for the theft of automobiles and 
the spiriting of them away into some other 
state and their sale or other disposition 
far away from the owner and his nei f hborhood 
have aroused Congress to devise some method 
for defeating the success of these Vlridel y 
spread schemes of l arceny. The ouick pa s sage 
of the machines into another state helps to 
conceal the trail of the thieves, get the 
stolen property into another jurisdiction 
and facilitate the finding of a safer place 
to dispose of the booty at a good price. 
This is a gross misuse of interstate comrnerce 11 • 
The colorful language was used by a court which was not liberal i n 
economic matters. Two years before, it had held minimum-wage legislation 
for women to be contrar y t o due p rocess clause (135). Commenting on 
J ustice Clarke's resignation in a letter to him, Pr esident Wilson had 
written, 11 I have been counting on the influence of you and Jus tice Br andeis 
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"Articles made by child labor and transported 
into other states were harmless and could be 
properly transported , without injuring any 
person who bought or used them". 
The illicit article cases, on the other hand, were cases where 
"the use of interstate commerce had contributed 
to the accomplishment of harrnful results to 
people of other states, and ~HH< the Congressional 
power over interstate transportation in such 
cases could only be effectively exercised by 
prohibiting it". 
In fact, it appeared that the invention of the automobile itself 
was to blame: 
"It is known of all men that the radical change 
in transportation of persons and g oods effected 
by the introduction of the automobile, the 
speed with which it moves, and the ease with 
which evil minded persons can avoid capture, 
have greatly encouraged and increased crimes. 
One of the crimes which have been encouraged 
is t he theft of the automobiles themselves and 
their immediate transportation to places remote 
from homes of the owner. Elabor ately organized 
conspiracies for the theft of automobiles and 
the spi riting of them away into some other 
state and their sale or other disposition 
far away from the owner ana his nei~hborhood 
have aroused Congress to devise some met hod 
for defeating the success of these widel y 
spread schemes of larceny. The quick passage 
of the machines into another state helps to 
conceal the trail of the thieves, get the 
stolen property into another jurisdiction 
and facilitate the finding of a safer place 
to dispose of the booty at a good price. 
This is a gross misuse of interstate comrnerce 11 • 
The colorful language was used by a court which was not liberal in 
economic matters. Two years before, it had held minimum-wage legislation 
for women to be contrary to due process clause (135). Commenting on 
J ustice Clarke's resignation in a letter to him, President Wilson had 
written, 111 have been counting on the influence of you and Justice Brandeis 
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to restrain the court in some Jre a sure from the extreme reactionary course 
which it seems inclined to follow 11 (136). A depression was arriving. 
By 1933 "at least thirteen million persons were unemployed" (137). The 
court permitted Minnesota to grant a mortgage moratorium (138). It 
permitted New York to impose a minimum retail price for milk over the 
1 
unappreciated objection of Justice McReynolds that it was not indic ated 
"how higher charges at stores to impoverished customers when the output 
is excessive and sale prices by producers are unrestrained can possibly 
increase receipts at the farm" (139). 
Two cases presented a striking contract in the interpretation of the 
commerce clause. The first was the Carter Coal case (140). The federal 
government, through the mechanism of a tax and credit system, had sought 
"to fix the minimum price of coal at each and every coal mine in the 
United States". Employees were to be given the right to organize and to 
bargain collectively. The act set maximum hours of labor and minimum 
wages. It was held to be unconstitutional. 
The government in its brief described the act as one intended "to 
remove burdens and obstructions from interstate commerce". The causal 
relationship between wages and hours in this industry and interstate commer ce 
was direct. 11I n many fields, wages constitute over 60% of the total 
cost of production and t he remaining costs consist of items which offer 
little leeway for reductions" (141). In any event, the federal government 
, could set the terms under which commerce could be used; it could itself 
control and restrain commerce. The brief continued: 
"Much of the legislation sustained by this court 
as an exercise of the commerce power has, so 
far from increasing the volume of commerce or 
providing for its safety , actually destroy ed 
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it by prohibition without in any way tending 
to increase the volume or promote the safety of 
commerce in other articles ~HH(-. It does not say 
that the power may be used to insure the safety 
of individuals traveling in railroad trains, or to 
protect the interest of shippers in not having to 
p~y excessive freight rates, or to preserve the 
morals of the community by making it unlawful to 
transport women across a state line for innnoral 
purposes, or to safeguard the health of the 
community in penalizing the shipment in interstate 
comrrerce of the pure food or adulterated drugs". 
11It could have been urged against the Pure Food and 
Drug Act that its objective was to promote health 
and that the Consti tution nowhere confers upon the 
federal government any power to promote health; 
it could have been urged against the Mann White 
Slave Act that its objective was to promote 
morality and that the Constitution nowhere confers 
upon the federal government the power to promote 
morality; it could have been urged against the 
Motor Theft Act that its objective was to prevent 
theft and that the Constitution nowhe re confers 
upon the federal government the power to prevent 
breaches of state law. In ,all of these cases, 
however, the Acts were sustained because, irres-
pective of their objective, they were obviously 
regulations of commerce; and the fact that their 
objective was, in one way or another, to promote 
the g eneral welfare did not invalidate them as 
regulations of commerce, but served rather to 
explain and justify the regulation 11 (142) . 
The court said that it agreed with the g overnment t hat 11 the validity 
of the exaction does not rest upon the taxing power but upon the power of 
Congress to regulate interstate comrrerce 11 • It was ''no longer open to 
question that the general government, unlike the states -:H:~~ possesses no 
inherent power in respect to the internal aff airs of the states -:H~ . Every 
journey to a forbidden ending begins with the first step 11 • Plainly, the 
incidents leading up to and culminating in the mining of coal do not 
constitute "intercourse for the purpose of trade". No distinction was more 
popular to the common mind, it said, quoting Kidd v. Pearson than that 
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between manufa cture a nd commerce". 
The second case was Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. I. C. R. Co; (143). 
It involved the constitutionali t y of the As hurast-Sumners Act which made 
it unlawful "knowingly to transport in interstate or foreign commerce 
1 goods made by convict labor i nto any state where the goods are intended 
to be received -~~"** in violation of its 1 aws". The court held the Act to 
be constitutional. Its constitutionality was att a cked on the grounds that 
' the regulation was a prohibition. 
11It is well settled -lHH~ that no such power to 
regulate through prohibition can be exercised 
with reference to useful and harmless arti cles 
of commerce ~HH:- . Congres s has no power to look 
bey ond the article itself. It can consider only 
the inherently evil or harmful qualities of the 
article it self, or the evil or harmful uses for 
which it is designed" (144). 
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I t was di f ficult to see any harm in the horse col lars and harness lj 
whic h the petitioner manufactured. However, the cour t, in a unanimous 
decision responded by showing how Congress might connect the article with 
• an anticipated evi l. At a t ime when the court was s t rained almost to th e 
II 
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breaking point against New De al legislation, and had refused to see any 
l ikelihood of anticipated evil in coal mined outside of imposed regulations, 
Chi ef Jus tice Hughes was able to write an opinion about convict-made goods 
which almost pushed the Child Labor case out of the books. 
"The antic i pated evil", wrote the Chief Justice, 
11may proceed from something inherent in the 
subject of transportation as in the case of 
diseased or noxious articles which are unfi t for 
commerce ~HH~ . Or the evil may lie in the purpose 
of the transportation, as in the case of lottery 
tickets, or the transport ation of women for immoral 
purposes ?H:-l:-. The prohi bition may be designed to 
give effect to the policies of the Congress in 
relation to the instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, as in the case of commodities owned by 
inter state carriers -l~PA-. And while the power to 
regulate interstate commerce resides in the 
Congress, which must determine its mm policy, the 
Congress may shape that policy in the light of the 
fact that transportation in interstate commerce, 
if permitted, would aid in the frustration of 
valid state laws -JH:-r.-n. 
Motor vehicles were themselves useful and proper subjects of commerce, 
but their transportation by one who knows they have been stolen is 11 a gross 
misuse of interstate commerce". Even intoxicating liouors, for that 
matter, were legitimate articles of commerce. The Child Labor case was 
different, for the "court concluded that the Act of Con.r.rress -~HH<- had its 
aim - the placing of local production under federal control". The category 
1 of illicit articles now converted to one of anticipated evil continued 
to ride along side of the equal category of local production. The Carter 
Coal case was one; the Kentucky Vlhip was the other. 
Kentuc~ \Vh~ was decided on January 4, 1937. On February 5th, 
President Roosevelt proposed his "reform of the judi ciary". The bill would 
have added another justice to the Supreme Court for each justice over 
seventy years of age. The wBjority of the court were under great pressure . 
Looking back, it appears that controversial issues had made the majority 
less amenable to a philosophy of increased government responsibility. 
\'vhere the controversy was least, as with stolen automobiles or the products 
of prison labor, increased powers had been granted, even though the absence 
of controversy did not mean that such measures had the approval of a whole 
people. These cases would have been persuasive without a dramatic shift 
in the court's point of view. In the long run, it seems now tha t a shift 
was inevitable. A written constitution could justify delay; its ambiguous 
terms could hardly prevent change as people saw problems in a new light . 
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Causal connections which justified the change might not actually exist. 
The economic theories expounded by the government in the Carter Coal case 
might be low grade, but they were believed. Education, or the lack of it, 
would change the meaning of words. ·when the shift came, it would not even 
have to be justified by a realignment of cases; reference to a "rediscovered" 
Constitution would suffice. The court-packing plan made the shift more 
dramatic but surely no more decisive than it would have been. 
March 29, 1937, was the day of the shift. On that day, the court 
upheld the Washington Minimum Wage legislati on (145). It stated that it 
was "unnecessary to cite official statistics to establish what is corrnnon 
knowledge through the length and breadth of the land". It upheld the 
Railway Labor Act and did so in its application to repair-shop employees. 
The decision was unanimous. Referring to the pronouncement in the 
"Employee Is Liability'' cases, the back-shop employees were beyond the reach 
of the commerce power, Justice Stone wrote, 
"Whatever else may be said of that pronouncement 
it is obvious that the commerce power is as much 
dependent upon the type of regulation as its 
subject matter. It is enough for present purposes 
that experience has shown that the failure to settle 
by peaceful means, the grievances of railroad 
employees with respect to rates of pay, rules or 
working conditions, is far more likely to hinder 
intetstate commerce than the failure to compensate 
workers who have suffered an injury in the course 
of their employment" (146). 
The National Lawyers Committee, ''organized under the auspices of the 
I Liberty League and composed of the 58 members of the American bar, had 
issued a comprehensive report contending that the Wagner Act was unconsti-
tutional and represented 1 a complete departure from our constitutional and 
traditional theories of g overnment 1 11 (147). On April 12, t he Wagner Labor 
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Relations Act was held to be constitutional (14 8). The National Labor 
Relations Board had found the Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation guilty 
of unfair labor practices by "discriminating against members of the union 
with regard to hire and tenure of employment" and by discharging employees 
in order to interfere with labor organization. The Chief Justice set forth 
the argument of the company. 
"The industrial relations and activities in the 
manufacturing department of respondent's enter-
prise are not subject to federal regulation. 
The argument rests upon the proposition that 
manufacturing itself is not commerce". 
The g over nment had responded by portraying a stream or flow of commerce 
through the manufacturing plant. But it was not necessary to decide the 
case by analogy to stream or co~~erce cases. In contradiction to the 
language of the Carter Coal case, 11 the question is necessarily one of 
degree". It was decisive that 11 the stoppage of these operations by indus-
trial strife would have a most serious effect upon interstate commerce 
it is idle to say that the effect would be indirect or remote. It is 
obvious that it would be immediate and might be catastrophic 11 • 
In May, the Alabama Compensation Act (149) and the Federal Social 
Security Act (150) were upheld. 11It is too late toda yll, wrote Justice 
Cardozo, "for the argument to be heard with tolerance that in a crisis so 
extreme the use of moneys of the nation to relieve the unemployed and thei r 
dependents is a use for a purpose narrower than t he promotion of the general 
welfare". Justice McReynolds in his dissent appeared to characterize the 
majority opinion as a 11 cloud of words" and an 11 ostentatious parade of 
irrelevent statistics". Then the term ended. The membership of the court 
began to change. Five new justices were added within three years. The 
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court had been reconstructed. Justice Frankfurter later proclaimed the 
fact of "an important shift in constitutional doctrine ~HH* after a recon-
struction in the membership of the courtr'. He then said, "such shifts of 
opinion should not derive from mere private judgment. They must be duly 
mindful of the necessary demands of continuity in civilized society. A 
reversal of a long current of decisions can be justified only if rooted 
in the Constitution itself as an historic document designed for a developing 
nation11 (151). The old categories an:i the same judicial technique was 
followed. 
The registration provisions of the Holding Company Act (152) and the 
Filled Milk Act (153), were both upheld by the court in 1938. These cases 
were based on the power of the federal government to close the channels of 
1 interstate commerce. Companies which failed to register under the Holding 
Company Act were denied the use of the mails and other instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce. The protesting holding company operated through its 
system in thirty-two states. Its subsidiaries transmitted energy across 
state lines. The lottery, commodity clause, kidnaper and convict-made 
goods cases showed that "When Congress lays down a valid rule to govern 
those engaged in interstate commerce, Congress may deny to those who violate 
the rule the right to engage in such transactions". The decision could 
have been expected even before the shift in court personalities. 
The same thing could be said of the Filled Milk case. The congress-
ional act prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of skimmed-milk 
compounds, with any fat or oil other than milk fat, so as to resemble milk 
or cream. It was clear now that Congress was 
11 free to exclude from interstate commerce articles 
whose use in the states for which they are destined 
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it may reasonably conceive to be injurious to 
the public health, morals or welfare ~Hf-l~ or 
which contravenes the policy of the state of 
their destination". 
Affirmative evidence showed "that the use of filled-milk as a substitute 
for pure milk is generally injurious to health and facilitates fraud on the 
public". The inquiries of Justice McReynolds into the rational basis for 
New Deal legislation had not been popular. It was not clear that this was 
a matter for the court to decide. Yet Justice Hughes had distingUished 
the false and fraudulent from the field of speculation. Justice Roberts 
had discussed the psychology of railroad employees. Now Justice Stone 
seemed to a gree that such an expert inquiry was proper. 111Ne may assume 
for present purposes that no pronouncement of a legislatm·e can forestall 
attack upon the constitutionality of the prohibition which it enacts by 
applying opprobrious epithets to the prohibited act". This was a view from 
which only Justice Black dissented. 
Mulford v. Smith (154) demonstrated the shift in the court. As a 
result of the Butler case, a new act had been passed which p ermitted the 
Secretary of Agriculture to fix marketing quotas for cotton, wheat, corn, 
tobacco and rice. Justice Roberts found the act to be constitutional and 
did so without any reference to his opinion in the Butler case. The 
Pure Food and Drug Act, Mann .Act, stolen motor vehicle and lottery cases 
permitted him to say that 11 _Any rule ~H'rr.- to prevent the flov< of commerce 
I 
from doing harm to the people of the nation is within the competence of 
1 Congress". Here also there was "a stream of commerce" and a "throat where 
tobacco enters the stream of corrrnerce - the marketing warehouse 11 • It did 
not purport to control production. The words were the same but the net 
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result was different. Only the dissent of Justice Butler showed what the 
relationship used to be. The Butler case had showed that t he Tenth Amend-
ment did not permit Congress to control farm production. Here, "punishment 
for selling is the exact equivalent of punishing for raising the tobacco". 
This was an absolute prohibition of comnerce and the cases dealing with 
illicit articles, adulteration, immoral purposes, stolen automobiles and 
kidnapped persons gave "no support to the view that Congress has power 
generally to prohibit or limit as it may choose, transportation in inter-
state commerce of corn, cotton, rice, tobacco or wheat". 
In United States v. Darby (155), the shift resulted from the disavowal 
of the Child Labor cases. The Fair Labor Standards Act operated in part 
through the prohibition of shipments in interstate co~nerce of articles 
manufactured by employees whose wa ges were less than a minimum or weekly 
hours greater than a maximum. The opinion of the Chief Justice made it 
clear that it was the Child Labor cases which were wrong and which, not 
having been foll owed, could now be overruled. It was as though there had 
been no recent shift but a mistake in 1918. No doubt one could say that 
from the lottery cases to the control over the marketing of agricultur al 
products, t here had been a steadily increasinf acceptance of government 
regulation by prohibition and in this line of reasoning the Child Labor 
cases were an exception. The court had swung back and forth many times 
from t he broad view of Gibbons v. Ogden. At a much earlier date, Justice 
Story had ~Titten, 
"The doctrines and op~n~ons of the 1 old court 1 
are daily losing ground ~:--1:--1:-. The doctrines of 
the Constitution, so vital to t he country, which in 
former times received the support of the whole court, 
no longer maintain thei r ascendancy''· 
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The reversal of Hammer v. Dagenhart was appropriately accomplished 
by reference to the Constitution as a growing instrument, if cases can show 
the growth. The government had made a full-dress attack on the meaning 
of the commerce clause, shovung, as it apparently not realized in pri or 
briefs, that at the time of the Convention: 
"Lexicographers, economists and authors used 
the term 'commerce' to refer not only to the 
narrow concepts of sale or exchange, but to 
include the eNtire moneyed economy, embracing 
production and manufacture as well as exchangen. 
Nevertheless, the g overnment was careful to point out that "the men 
~no met in Philadelphia did not create an instrument fitted to cope only 
1 with the exigencies of their time: they realized that the Constitution 
must apply in a 'remote futurity' bringing contingencies ~Hl-~ illimitable 
in their nature ~H* " (156). Counsel for Darby stated frankly that "the 
1 Constitution defines logical analysis" and advocated the use of "judicial 
gloss". Pre-eminent in the judicial gloss seen by the court were the cases 
of illicit articles, intoxicating liquor, white slavery, lottery cases, 
· adulterated articles, stolen articles, kidnapped persons, convict-made 
goods and filled milk. These cases had done their work; perhaps they could 
now be forgotten, for, as the Chief Justice said, they pointed to a dis-
1· tinction between things ha.rmful in themselves or having some deleterious 
I 
I 
property and other commodities - a distinction nwhi ch was novel when made 
and unsupported by any provision of the Constitutionn. Indeed, it was a 
1 distinction which had long been abandoned. Reasoning by example had expanded 
the category to include ordinary commodities. 
'I 
II 
CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
The examples which have been used to illustrate the course of legal 
reasoning in the fields of case law, statutory and constitutional i nter-
pretations are related. The category of things dangerous in themselves 
from the field of case law and the concept of commodities in themselves 
evil from the field of constitutional law are in a way very similar. The 
hj_story of the gradual growth of the inherently dangerous. or evil category 
is a ·history of expansion through reasoning by example until previously 
innocuous items are included. The growth is a r eflection of a period in 
'· which increasing governmental control and responsibility for the individual 
, were thought to be proper. No one economic or social theory was responsible, 
although as changes came about in the manner of living, the social theor,r 
moved ahead to explain and persuade. The social theor,r was useful in 
explaining connections. Society·~ s point of view was rapidly changing . 
I t could not have been planned that way; it merely happened. 
The legal theories were not an exact reflection of social theories. 
The liability of a seller of a previously inAocuous article was not enlarged 
because some economic theory said that this extension would be appropriate. 
Rather, the growth of inventions made it hard to distinguish, when reason-
, ing by example was used, between steam engines thought to be unusual and 
. dangerous in an early day and engines that moved and were now commonplace. 
A change in the method of selling and in social life made it difficult to 
distinguish between what had once been the small group around a vendor and 
the vast national market of modern business. Since the difference could 
no longer be felt, it fell away. Similarly, in the development of a 
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Constitution, increased transactions and modes of communication made 
activities previously remote and local now a matter of national interest. 
When a wage earner in Boston thought his pay was dependent upon the 
standard of living in Florida, whether it was or not, a fundamental change 
in social-economic thinking had taken place. 
The emphasis should be on the process. The contract between logic and 
the actual legal method is a disservice to both. Legal reasoning has a 
logic of its own. Its structure fits it to give meaning to ambiguity and to 
test constantly whether the society has come to see new differences or 
similarities. Social theories and other changes in society will be 
relevant when the ambiguity has to be resolved for a pa rticular case. Nor 
can it be said that the result of such a method is too uncertain to compel. 
The compulsion of the law is clear; the explanation is tha t the area of 
doubt is constantly set forth. The probable area of expansion and contra-
diction is foreshadowed as the system works. This is the only kind of a 
sys tem which will work when people do not agree completely. The loyalty 
of the community is directed toward the institution in which it participates. 
The words chan!Se to receive the content v~hich the community gives to them. 
The effort to find c cmplete agreement before the institution goes to work 
is meaningless. It is to forget the very purpose for whic h the institution 
of legal reasoning has been fashioned. This should be remembered as a 
world community suffers in the absence of law and orderly reasoning. 
Democratic soci ety requires that the rules of society be clearly 
stated and not changed by the whim of a judge. Such an analysis as has 
been here undertaken emphasizes the dynamic role of le gal concept s and 
traces typical developments in the fields of case law, statutory law and 
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constitutional law. I t removes the basic conflict sometimes seen between 
logic and experience and demonstrates how the l aw develops through a logic 
of its own, designated primarily as reasoning by example. In this system 
of logic, the doctrine of precedent is given a new meaning and validity, 
legal concepts are related to the customary ideas of the community and the 
importance of ambiguity and uncertainty in establishing the necessary 
' agreement for stability in the state is stressed. 
Perhaps the deadliest sin of our law profession is legalism. Although 
it has never wholly hardened the arteries of American law, it has sometimes 
clogged them unconfortably. The law craft is amazingly shielded behind 
a curtain of technical 11 jabberwocky". Therefore, in the interest of good 
public relations, the bench and bar must take immediate steps to explain 
what is legalistic logic to those who are bound by .juristic thought; namely, 
all of us. 
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